Fatigue: Investigation of a Human Factor for Regional Airline Pilots by Mikkelsen, Doug
Theses - Daytona Beach Dissertations and Theses 
Summer 1998 
Fatigue: Investigation of a Human Factor for Regional Airline 
Pilots 
Doug Mikkelsen 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University - Daytona Beach 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/db-theses 
 Part of the Aviation Commons 
Scholarly Commons Citation 
Mikkelsen, Doug, "Fatigue: Investigation of a Human Factor for Regional Airline Pilots" (1998). Theses - 
Daytona Beach. 145. 
https://commons.erau.edu/db-theses/145 
This thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University – Daytona Beach at 
ERAU Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in the Theses - Daytona Beach collection by an 
authorized administrator of ERAU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact commons@erau.edu. 
FATIGUE: INVESTIGATION OF A HUMAN FACTOR 
FOR REGIONAL AIRLINE PILOTS 
by 
Douglas S. Mikkelsen 
A Thesis Submitted to the 
Aeronautical Science Department 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Aeronautical Science 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Daytona Beach, Florida 
Summer 1998 
UMI Number: EP31830 
INFORMATION TO USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy 
submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations 
and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper 
alignment can adversely affect reproduction. 
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized 
copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. 
® UMI 
UMI Microform EP31830 
Copyright 2011 by ProQuest LLC 
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. 
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 
FATIGUE: INVESTIGATION OF A HUMAN FACTOR 
FOR REGIONAL AIRLINE PILOTS 
by 
Douglas S. Mikkelsen 
This thesis was prepared under the direction of the candidate's thesis 
committee chair, Dr.Thomas R. Weitzel, Department of Aeronautical Science, 
and has been approved by the members of his thesis committee. It was 
submitted to the Department of Aeronautical Science and was accepted in 
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Aeronautical Science 
THESIS COMMITTEE: 
Dr. Thomas Weitzel,(phair 
i n c o i o i/v^iviivii i i c c ^ _ 
)rrSteven Hampton, Member 
Mr. Donajd-Huct, Member 
MAS Graduate Program Chair 
epartment Chair,(£leronautical Science 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to take this opportunity to thank the many people who helped 
to make this thesis a reality. Their generous support and dedication to the 
project is greatly appreciated. 
I was fortunate to have an excellent thesis committee, and I am very 
thankful for their expertise. Dr. Thomas Weitzel and Bea Mueller graciously 
welcomed me in to their office and home for many long days of data analysis. 
Dr. Steven Hampton and Professor Donald Hunt were also very generous with 
their time and effective suggestions. 
Professor John Young of Purdue University and Captain John Piercy 
provided excellent advice to help fine-tune the instrument used in the study. 
Ms. Monica Frappier of ERAU's Graduate Programs was always available for 
advice and counseling, and she set me in the right direction many times. 
The project was a success because of the team effort displayed by 
everyone involved. It was an enjoyable and educational experience, which I 
am hopeful will help to improve regional airline safety. 
iii 
ABSTRACT 
Author: Doug Mikkelsen 
Title: Fatigue: Investigation of a Human Factor for Regional 
Airline Pilots 
Institution: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Degree: Master of Aeronautical Science 
Year: 1998 
This study analyzed the causes of regional airline pilot fatigue and the 
impact on pilot performance. An instrument was developed and refined through 
a field study validation by a panel of experts. The final instrument was 
distributed to three groups of regional airline pilots. The data supported the 
literature review, which revealed many causes of pilot fatigue, including flight 
crew schedules that are not compatible with human limitations; Federal Aviation 
Regulations (FARs) that have not evolved with the advancement of aircraft 
performance and the public demand for 24 hour availability of flights; and poor 
personal habits. An analysis of the data and literature led to the following 
conclusions: (a) the existing flight crew schedules and FARs pertaining to flight 
time limitations and rest requirements are not compatible with human 
limitations, (b) fatigue has a negative impact on pilot performance, and (c) pilot 
fatigue has been a contributing factor in many aircraft accidents and incidents. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
There has been a rapid evolution of the aviation/aerospace industry 
throughout the 20th century. The Wright brothers accomplished the first 
manned, controlled, powered flight on December 17, 1903. Non-stop flights 
across the Atlantic were made as early as 1919. The first jet aircraft were flown 
in the 1940s, and Chuck Yeager became the first man to fly an aircraft faster 
than the speed of sound in 1947. Neil Armstrong and Ed Aldrin landed the 
Lunar Module on the moon on July 20, 1969. Twelve years later the most 
complex flying machine ever built (the space shuttle Columbia), was launched 
from the Kennedy Space Center. On December 23, 1986 Jeana Yeager and 
Dick Rutan made the first nonstop-without-refueling flight around the world. The 
aircraft and missions flown have changed drastically over the last 95 years, 
however the pilots flying them are still human. 
The aviation industry has evolved into a 24-hour operation. 
Unfortunately this creates a great challenge to human physiology. Irregular 
work schedules, rotating shifts, and night work are very common; and can all 
lead to pilot fatigue. The duties of an airline pilot have changed dramatically 
over the years. However, the physiological limitations of the pilots have 
remained the same, and the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) are 
essentially unchanged. 
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Fortunately, the aviation industry is served by some very exceptional 
human beings. Pilots tend to be achievement oriented, with a very strong 
desire to progress and succeed. The hub and spoke system has created a 
greater demand for flights to operate on-time, which in turn places a subtle 
pressure on the flight crews to stay on schedule. Maintenance and weather 
delays combined with passenger complaints may heighten this pressure. A 
flight crew may succumb to these pressures, and continue with their schedule, 
despite an unsafe level of fatigue. "There are no supermen where fatigue is 
concerned" (Enders, 1989, p. 1.4). 
There is a lack of consensus as to the measurement and definition of 
fatigue. Therefore investigators typically supply their own definition of the term 
(Dodge, 1982). Researchers at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Civil 
Aeromedical Institute have offered the following definition of fatigue: 
The undesirable state produced by effort - either the physical or mental 
effort of doing work or the effort of maintaining vigilance when there is no 
physical work to be done. Fatigue is an undesirable state because it 
causes people to commit errors; fatigue can adversely affect not only the 
accuracy but also the timeliness of performance (Higgins et al., 1982). 
The preceding definition, although accurate is perhaps incomplete. A 
more recent and comprehensive definition provided by Hawkins (1993) 
considered the items included in the preceding definition as well as two 
additional ways that fatigue is produced; "[Fatigue] may reflect inadequate rest, 
[and] may refer to symptoms associated with disturbed or displaced biological 
rhythms which are often described by the sufferer simply as jet lag. [It is 
important to be specific when discussing the condition of fatigue], its origins, 
effects and remedial action" (p. 57). 
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Lyman and Orlady (1981) analyzed the data collected by the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Aviation Safety Reporting 
System (ASRS) and reported that performance decrements associated with 
fatigue resulted in significant potentially unsafe conditions in the aviation 
system. Duty and sleep schedules were the major factors contained in the 
reports. In 1984, the British Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting 
Programme (CHIRP) disclosed that the majority of the reports received by their 
safety reporting system during the first 18 months of operation, involved fatigue, 
sleep, and work patterns. A CHIRP administrator concluded that "the 
importance of disrupted sleep as a causative factor in accidents may have been 
underestimated" (Green, 1985, p. 638). 
Humans perform many critical functions in the daily aviation operations. 
Therefore, human physiological limitations should be considered in order to 
reduce fatigue and increase regional airline safety. To reduce the number of 
human errors in the cockpit, crew schedules should provide ample time for 
adequate, consistent rest and proper nutrition. 
The Importance of the Study 
Thousands of people travel on regional airlines every day in the United 
States. These passengers deserve a well rested flight crew and the highest 
possible level of safety. Federico Pena addressed an international symposium 
on fatigue and stated that "the traveling public has just as much right to expect 
transportation operators to be unimpaired by fatigue as they have the right to 
expect operators to be unimpaired by alcohol or drugs" (NTSB, 1996, p. 8). 
The mission of every airline should be to safely transport the passengers to their 
desired destinations. Making a profit for the owners or shareholders (although 
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necessary for the airline's continued existence) has to remain secondary to this 
primary mission. 
In 1980, NASA sponsored a workshop on pilot fatigue and circadian 
desynchronosis, in response to a Congressional request to determine whether 
"the circadian rhythm phenomenon, also called jet lag, is of concern" (NASA, 
1981, p. 1). A very diverse group of experts attended the workshop, including 
representatives of airline pilots and management, and scientists from academia, 
the military services and federal agencies. The statements made by the 
participants during the first day indicated that: 
most did not perceive a major problem relating to pilot fatigue or to 
circadian desynchronosis as factors in air safety. As the participants 
received additional information from their colleagues, these views began 
to change... (p. 4) 
After 3 days of discussions it was determined that pilot performance 
degradation as a result of fatigue is a problem that should concern the 
aeronautical community. Perhaps these workshops should be held on a 
regular basis. 
The workshop participants agreed that pilot fatigue is increased (and 
therefore pilot performance is degraded) as a result of: 
1. Sleep loss or deprivation and alterations of habitual sleep/wake 
cycles. 
2. Circadian desynchronization associated with time-zone changes 
and irregularity of work/rest cycles. 
3. Long duty hours. 
4. Other human factors such as: 
a. Long periods of low activity and lowered sensory input. 
b. Letdown/relaxation/boredom. 
c. Less than optimal nutrition. 
d. Use of alcohol or other non-nutritive substances used to 
counteract fatigue and sleep difficulty. (NASA, 1981, p. 5) 
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These four items roughly coincide with the previously mentioned definition of 
fatigue offered by Hawkins. 
Despite the enlightened awareness displayed by many of the workshop 
attendees, there appears to be a reluctance on the part of pilots, airline 
management, and the FAA to admit that fatigue in the cockpit is a problem 
which negatively impacts the safety of flight. Some of the participants felt that 
"it was neither fair nor correct to imply that pilot fatigue (or pilot performance 
degradation) was a cause of accidents, since the number of airline accidents is 
relatively small" (NASA, 1981, pp. 4-5). 
There is a "common belief that fatigue is not an acceptable excuse for an 
error because flying when tired is so much a part of the pilot profession" 
(Graeber, 1988, p. 306). One purpose of this study is to help dispel that belief, 
and perhaps improve regional airline safety. 
Statement of the Problem 
This study proposes to analyze some causes of regional airline pilot 
fatigue and introduce some correlation between human fatigue and pilot 
performance. 
Research Questions 
The research questions to be addressed are: Within the U.S. regional 
airline industry, (a) What are the causes of pilot fatigue? and (b) What is the 
impact of fatigue on pilot performance? 
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Delimitations 
The following restrictions existed with regard to the conduct of the 
proposed research: 
1. The study was limited to pilots employed by regional airlines 
registered in the U.S.A., flying aircraft with 19 to 70 passenger seats. 
2. Cognitive fatigue is the only type of human fatigue that was examined 
in this study. 
3. The study analyzed the impact of fatigue on regional airline pilots, and 
did not consider other employee groups (flight attendants, ramp personnel, 
mechanics, dispatchers, etc.). 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The lack of adequate time for rest between scheduled duty periods is a 
primary concern of regional airline pilots. One regional airline Captain 
submitted the following report to the NASA ASRS: 
I completed a minimum crew rest, and the next day my duty was 13:45. 
Both the First Officer and myself are showing signs of fatigue. I am 
unable to concentrate, cannot repeat clearances back if they contain 
more than 2 bits of information, and I cannot even remember my flight 
number. I have fixation on simple tasks. I am going to take some time 
off without pay because these effects seem to be cumulative and 
intensifying each stressful day. Commonly, I have had to go 18 to 24 
hours without eating. Attempts to ensure sleep needs and eating 
patterns is met with counseling and disciplinary action. (NASA ASRS 
Accession No. 123033) 
The symptoms and characteristics of fatigue and sleep deprivation mentioned 
by this Captain are very typical of the reports submitted to the NASA ASRS. 
Most people experience some level of fatigue almost every day of their 
lives. It may be a welcome feeling at the end of a long day and is typically not 
given serious thought. An individual under the influence of fatigue may 
recognize diminished performance or effectiveness, however safety is typically 
not a concern. "Unfortunately, this is not the case for those who fly airplanes" 
(Graeber, 1988, p. 305). 
Sleep and Sleep Deprivation 
Insufficient sleep is a potential source of pilot fatigue which may in turn 
have an impact on flight safety. A sleep deprived individual may not perform as 
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well as he normally would after a sufficient rest period, and may even doze off 
on the job (Stokes & Kite, 1994). 
Members of the NASA Ames Research Center Fatigue Countermeasures 
Program conducted an analysis of crew fatigue factors. This study pointed out 
that in the past sleep was viewed as an inactive state in which the human body 
is essentially turned off. However, scientific findings have proven that "sleep is 
a complex, active physiological state that is vital to human survival" (NTSB, 
1994, pp. 133-134). 
Fatigue and sleepiness are terms used to describe the symptoms of 
sleep deprivation. These terms are very similar to other symptoms of 
deprivation such as thirst or hunger. As an individual falls asleep, the external 
environment is perceptually disengaged. In other words the individual no 
longer integrates outside information. A person who is suffering from sleep 
deprivation is susceptible to episodes of microsleep (sometimes referred to as 
"spacing out"). These spontaneous events typically last for just a few seconds, 
however during this time the individual will not respond to external information, 
and therefore suffer a significant performance degradation (NTSB, 1994). This 
would certainly be a very hazardous situation if the individual was driving a car 
or flying an airplane. 
Researchers have failed to reach a consensus as to the optimal amount 
of sleep. In 1975, Webb and Agnew pointed out that people typically slept 9 
hours per night in the early 20th century. Several studies have shown that 
people typically sleep 2 hours more than usual, when they are allowed to sleep 
as long as they would like (Aserinsky, 1969; Gagnon, DeKoninck, & Broughton, 
1985; Verdone, 1968). There is a range of sleep requirements among 
individuals. Most adults require approximately 8 hours of sleep in order to 
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achieve a maximum level of performance and alertness while awake. However, 
some individuals are able to achieve these maximum levels after less than 6 
hours of sleep, while other individuals may require greater than 10 hours of 
sleep (NTSB, 1994). 
The symptoms of sleep deprivation are frequently dismissed as a minor 
annoyance. This is a potentially dangerous attitude because the typical 
symptoms of fatigue are slowed reaction time, difficulty prioritizing tasks or 
making decisions, impaired judgment, and having to continuously recheck 
information or activities because of memory degradation. Additional symptoms 
include decrements to vigilance and psychomotor coordination, headaches, 
burning eyes, fixation and increased negative emotions (worsened mood) 
(NTSB, 1994). An individual suffering from these performance decrements is 
"unlikely to be aware of the manner and extent of his deteriorating performance" 
(Hawkins, 1993, p. 78). 
Sleep loss is cumulative in nature, and individuals will accumulate a 
sleep debt after repeatedly receiving less sleep than they require. For example, 
when an individual who requires 8 hours of sleep only receives 6 hours, a sleep 
deprivation of 2 hours has been incurred. If the individual continues to receive 
only 6 hours of sleep over five consecutive days, then the total sleep debt will 
accumulate to 10 hours. Recuperation from a sleep debt generally requires 
deeper sleep over a period of two to three days (NTSB, 1994). 
Researchers at NASA Ames have differentiated sleepiness into two 
distinct components. The first is physiological sleepiness, which results from 
sleep loss. The second is subjective sleepiness, which is "an individual's 
introspective self-report regarding the individual's level of sleepiness" (NTSB, 
1994, p. 135). Many factors such as caffeine, physical activity, or a stimulating 
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environment will affect this subjective self-report. Individuals will typically report 
less sleepiness and a higher level of alertness, when one or more of these 
factors are present. Thus the tendency is for an individual to allow subjective 
sleepiness to mask the true level of physiological sleepiness. "This individual, 
in an environment stripped of factors that conceal the underlying physiological 
sleepiness, would be susceptible to the occurrence of spontaneous, 
uncontrolled sleep and the performance decrements associated with sleep 
loss" (NTSB, 1994, p. 135). 
Circadian Rhythms 
Human beings (and many other living organisms) have a circadian 
(derived from the Latin words circa [about] and dies [day]) "clock" in the brain. 
This clock regulates the pattern or rhythm of many physiological and behavioral 
functions, including our sleep/wake pattern, body temperature, hormone 
secretion, digestion, performance, and mood (Graeber, 1988). These rhythms 
follow a period of approximately 24 hours, and are influenced by several 
different zeitgebers (time givers). The most powerful are bright light (either from 
the sun or an artificial source) and darkness, however meals and physical and 
social activity also influence the circadian rhythms (Hawkins, 1993). 
Scientific studies have revealed that the period between 0300 and 0500, 
and the period between 1500 and 1700, are periods of maximal sleepiness for 
most individuals. These time periods are determined by our circadian rhythms, 
and regulated by the brain (NTSB, 1994). Individuals studied during these 
critical periods before dawn and in the middle of the afternoon have 
demonstrated a higher error rate leading to industrial incidents and accidents. 
"Knowing when industrial errors, incidents, and accidents are most likely to 
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occur across the day/night cycle can help to focus job design and redesign 
activities for safety-sensitive jobs" (Miller & Mitler, 1997, p. 12). 
Most people live in harmony with their circadian system by working 
during the day and sleeping at night. However, there are many people 
(including pilots) with jobs that conflict with their circadian rhythms. A 1994 
study of short-haul air transport operations revealed significant variations in 
flight crew duty and rest schedules. The researchers found that the inconsistent 
duty and rest schedules resulted in the pilot subjects taking longer to fall asleep, 
sleeping less, waking up earlier, and reporting lighter, poorer sleep with more 
awakenings (Gander, Graeber, Foushee, Lauber, & Connell, 1994). 
Circadian rhythms do not adjust immediately, and may never fully adjust 
to new sleep/wake schedules. The circadian rhythms of people who work at 
night and sleep during the day seem to be only distorted and not completely 
repositioned (Torsvall, Akerstedt, Gillander, & Knutsson, 1989). "Therefore, 
people probably have little voluntary control over the timing of performance 
deficits related to sleep disruption" (Miller & Mitler, 1997, p. 14). 
A disturbed pattern of biological rhythms is known as circadian disruption 
or circadian desynchronization, and has an influence on performance and 
safety (Hawkins, 1993). A study was conducted in 1970 which measured the 
performance of experienced pilots flying an F-104 simulator. The pilot's total 
performance as determined by three independent flight parameters showed 
significant rhythmic variations as a function of the time of day, and consistently 
worsened at night between the hours of 2100 and 0900 (Klein et al., 1970). It is 
important to recognize that night work significantly compromises an individual's 
ability to receive adequate sleep (Miller & Mitler, 1997). 
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In addition to the aforementioned sleep and performance decrements, 
there are several other symptoms associated with circadian desynchronization. 
These include: 
hunger at unusual times, digestive disturbances such as queasiness and 
constipation, and miscellaneous aches and pains. Chills can occur as 
body temperature now drops during waking hours instead of during 
sleep. Psychological symptoms include confusion, irritability, and other 
mood impairments, as well as a general loss of mental efficiency. 
Difficulties with time and distance estimation have also been noted, as 
well as psychomotor performance degradation, headaches, and anxiety. 
(Stokes & Kite, 1994, p. 271) 
The time required to resynchronize the disturbed circadian rhythms * 
varies from several days to several weeks (NTSB, 1994). There are several 
factors including age, physical fitness, and personality type that may affect the 
length of time required to adapt to a new sleep/wake schedule or new time zone 
(Hawkins, 1993). A study conducted by the NASA Ames Research Center 
revealed that: 
age was significantly correlated with an increased number of 
awakenings, a higher percentage of light drowsy (i.e., restless) sleep, a 
lower percentage of deep (slow-wave) sleep, and lower sleep efficiency. 
This was particularly true for those crewmembers over 50 years of age. 
(The Royal Aeronautical Society, 1989, p.5.4) 
Fatigue Related Incidents and Accidents 
On November 1-2, 1995 a symposium on fatigue in transportation was 
co-sponsored by the NTSB and the NASA Ames Fatigue Countermeasure 
Research Group. The Chairman of the NTSB, Mr. Jim Hall opened the 
symposium by remarking that fatigue is one of the major hazards of 
transportation, and that during the 23 year period from 1972 to 1995, the NTSB 
issued nearly 80 fatigue-related safety recommendations. Hall continued: 
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while we all study the problem, accidents continue to happen.... 
Commuter pilots often fly a dozen legs in one day, and after a shortened 
rest period, do it again the next day The American taxpayers 
invested millions of dollars in research into programs that examine 
fatigue. . . . At some point we must decide that, while research should 
never end, the time for study must yield to a time for action. (NTSB, 1996, 
pp. 4-5) 
Jim Danaher, Chief of the NTSB Operation Factors Division (retired 
January, 1998) also addressed the symposium attendees. He stated that: 
In its investigation of numerous accidents in all transportation modes, the 
Safety Board has identified serious and continuing problems concerning 
the far-reaching effects of fatigue, sleepiness, sleep disorders, and 
circadian factors in transportation system safety. We have seen repeated 
instances of poor scheduling of work and rest periods in all transportation 
modes that have or might have affected adversely the performance of 
operating personnel. (NTSB, 1996, p.11) 
Accident investigators have rarely named fatigue as the probable cause 
(or even a causal factor) of an accident. This does not mean that the crew was 
necessarily well rested at the time of the accident. The problem is that fatigue is 
very difficult to measure even in advanced laboratories, and nearly impossible 
to precisely measure after an accident (Barlay, 1990). 
A French accident investigator stated that: 
our lack of knowledge about fatigue may well prove to be the chief 
explanation of those accidents which are now put down to "pilot error" or 
"the human factor" simply because we don't quite understand what 
makes well-qualified, conscientious specialists, like pilots, commit almost 
unbelievably stupid mistakes. (Barlay, 1970, p. 322) 
That statement was made approximately 30 years ago, and although our 
knowledge of fatigue has grown substantially since then, accident investigators 
continue to use the generic term "pilot error", because it is difficult to prove that 
fatigue was a causal factor. After an accident the investigators typically 
consider the flight crew's duty, flight, and rest schedule for the preceding 
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72 hours. However, even a detailed analysis of a crew's schedule is not 
sufficient to determine the impact of fatigue on their performance. 
The First Solo Flight Across the Atlantic 
One of the earliest reports of pilot fatigue was made by Charles 
Lindbergh. He departed from New York on May 20, 1927, on his record setting, 
first solo flight across the Atlantic. He came close to not completing the flight 
after falling asleep at the controls. Fortunately he woke up and recovered from 
his descent toward the Atlantic Ocean (Graeber, 1988). 
The night before his departure, the weather forecast changed, and he 
had to make arrangements late that night for a departure at dawn. He posted a 
friend as a guard outside his hotel room door, but was unable to get any sleep. 
He made his departure early the next morning, and found himself fighting 
exhaustion after only four hours of flight. Eight hours into the flight his lack of 
sleep became hazardous, as portrayed in his journal: 
My eyes feel dry and hard as stones. The lids pull down with pounds of 
weight against their muscles. Keeping them open is like holding arms 
outstretched without support. After a minute or two of effort, I have to let 
them close. Then, I press them tightly together, forcing my mind to think 
about what I'm doing so I won't forget to open them again; trying not to 
move stick or rudder, so the plane will still be flying level and on course 
when I lift them heavily. (Lindbergh, 1953, p. 233) 
Continental Express - Pine Bluff. Arkansas 
On April 29, 1993, a Continental Express Brasilia (30 passenger 
turboprop aircraft) entered a stall and lost approximately 12,000 feet of altitude 
before the flight crew was able to regain control. The aircraft experienced a 
descent rate in excess of 17,000 feet per minute (fpm), roll angles in excess of 
90 degrees, and suffered extensive damage to the left engine. The crew 
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executed a forced landing at Pine Bluff, Arkansas; they were unable to stop the 
aircraft on the runway. Twelve passengers and one crewmember received 
minor injuries. The NTSB report (1994a) stated that "contributing to the 
accident was fatigue induced by the flight crew's failure to properly manage 
provided rest periods" (p. 31). 
The crew had been assigned a 3 day sequence with a report time on day 
1 of 1328. They were on duty until 2246 and then began a reduced rest period 
of approximately 8 hours. The Captain received approximately 6 hours of sleep 
and the First Officer received approximately 4 1/2 hours of sleep, during this first 
rest period. They were not provided with a sufficient amount of time to receive 
adequate rest (NTSB, 1994a, pp. 9-11). 
The second day was relatively short with a duty period from 0650 to 
1130, followed by an 18 hour rest period. The Captain and the First Officer 
received approximately 4 1/2 hours of sleep, during this second rest period. 
They were provided with a sufficient amount of time to receive adequate rest, 
"however they did not take advantage of this opportunity" (NTSB, 1994a, p. 27). 
It is unclear whether the crew chose to sleep such a short period of time, or 
were unable to sleep due to internal factors (e.g. circadian disruption) or 
external factors (e.g. noisy hotel). 
The crew reported for duty at 0530 on the 3rd day and had been on duty 
for approximately 10 hours at the time of this accident. The Captain stated that 
"the workload was slightly heavier on the last day due to having seven legs to 
fly in [Instrument Meteorological Conditions] IMC" (NTSB, 1994a, p.27). The 
accident occurred on the crew's seventh leg, in the late afternoon, during one of 
the periods typically associated with low levels of performance and alertness. 
The NTSB stated that "the combined effects of cumulatively limited sleep, a 
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demanding day of flying, and a time of day associated with fatigue had an effect 
on crew performance" (p. 27). 
American International Airways - Guantanamo Bav. Cuba 
On August 18,1993, at 1654 Eastern Daylight Time, a DC-8 operated by 
American International Airways (AIA) crashed 1/4 mile short of the runway, after 
the Captain lost control of the airplane while on approach to the U.S. Naval Air 
Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The airplane was destroyed by the impact 
and subsequent fire, however the crew miraculously survived to tell their story. 
A photograph of the wreckage is provided in Appendix A. This was the first 
aircraft accident in which the NTSB cited crew fatigue as the probable cause in 
their report. Therefore, the researcher has reviewed this accident in detail 
(NTSB, 1994b). 
Several airports are included in the discussion of this accident. A 
decoding of their respective three-letter airport codes is as follows: 
ATL Atlanta, GA NGU Norfolk, VA 
CLT Charlotte, NC UGM Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 
DFW Dallas/Ft. Worth, TX YIP Ypsilanti, Ml 
The crew had been assigned a four day sequence beginning at ATL on 
August 16. They were on duty for 13 hours the first night (from 2300 to 1200 
noon the following day). This duty period included four flights (ATL-CLT-YIP-
STL-DFW), and a total of 5.6 hours of flight time. They were released from duty 
at 1200, and were provided hotel rooms near the DFW Airport. Their next duty 
period was scheduled to begin 11 hours later, at 2300 (NTSB, 1994b). 
The Captain went to bed immediately upon arrival at his hotel room at 
1300, and slept until 1800. He then arose, jogged, showered, had dinner, and 
reported for duty. The First Officer and Flight Engineer had breakfast prior to 
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going to sleep, some time after 1300, and received 8 hours and 6 hours of sleep 
respectively, prior to reporting for duty that night at 2300 (NTSB, 1994b). 
They departed DFW at midnight and arrived at YIP at 0325. They had 
coffee and doughnuts while waiting for their next departure. They departed YIP 
at 0620 and arrived in ATL at 0752. They were scheduled to be on a rest period 
in ATL until 2300, however due to mechanical problems on another one of the 
carrier's DC-8s, the crew was reassigned to continue on from ATL-NGU-UGM-
ATL (NTSB, 1994b). 
The crewmembers discussed their reassignment, and although they 
knew it would be a long day, and might be "pushing the edge" (approximately 
24 hours on duty and 12 hours of flight time), they realized it was a legal 
assignment according to the FARs. The First Officer stated in his post-accident 
interview that his knowledge of previous company actions regarding 
crewmembers refusing trips, deterred him from refusing this trip. Several former 
AIA pilots expressed their concerns about AIA crew scheduling practices, in 
testimony given to the NTSB after this accident. One pilot had witnessed a crew 
being subjected to intimidation by AIA management, after the crew had refused 
to fly a trip at the end of a long duty day (NTSB, 1994b). 
The AIA Chief Executive Officer was interviewed by the NTSB after the 
accident. He said that the company must often assign long duty times and 
"work everything right to the edge" of what is allowed by the FARs, in order to 
remain competitive. He indicated that this practice is "common" in the industry. 
He went on to say that "good" pilots are recognized for "pulling for the company" 
through support of company requirements, and that these good pilots are 
upgraded to the position of Captain, out of seniority (NTSB, 1994b, pp. 63-64). 
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The crew elected to accept the reassignment and departed ATL at 1010 
and arrived at NGU at 1140 (NTSB, 1994b). The flight from ATL to NGU was 
operated under FAR 121.505. This regulation limits flight and duty time to 8 and 
16 hours respectively, in any 24 consecutive hours. 
The crew departed NGU approximately 2 1/2 hours later, at 1413 and 
arrived in the Guantanamo Bay airspace at approximately 1630 (after being on 
duty for more than 16 hours). The flight from NGU to UGM was operated under 
FAR 121.521 (because UGM is an international destination). Flight 
crewmembers flying under this regulation may be placed on duty for 144 
continuous hours, without a rest period. According to the AIA chief crew 
scheduler, the carrier does have an unwritten, in-house policy of not assigning 
a crew to more than 24 consecutive hours of duty. The Captain and AlA's 
Principal Operations Inspector (POI) both testified that 24 hour duty periods are 
not uncommon at AIA (NTSB, 1994b). Flight time is limited by FAR 121.521 to a 
maximum of 12 hours in any 24 consecutive hours; 20 hours in any 48 
consecutive hours; and 24 hours in any 72 consecutive hours. 
The Captain was the flying pilot for the flight from NGU to UGM. The crew 
initially requested runway 28, however the Captain made a decision to try the 
approach to runway 10 (this approach requires a close-in right base, and a 
short final approach because of the close proximity of the prohibited Cuban 
airspace) (NTSB, 1994b). The Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) transcript of the 
conversation between the crewmembers is provided in Appendix B. 
The Captain simply got too slow with a steep bank, and stalled the 
aircraft. A 20,000 hour pilot, with a very experienced crew, was so fatigued that 
he stalled and crashed a "perfectly good airplane." The NTSB stated that "the 
substandard performance by an experienced pilot may have reflected the 
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debilitating influences from fatigue" (NTSB, 1994b, pp.59-60). The Captain 
demonstrated a level of performance well below that which is usually expected 
from a Captain with his level of experience. However, there is nothing in the 
Captain's aviation records that would suggest he is a substandard pilot. In fact 
there were several sources which confirmed the Captain's superior airmanship 
skills. 
At the NTSB post-accident hearing, the Captain was asked how he felt 
just prior to the accident. His response was: 
All I can say is that I was - I felt very lethargic or indifferent. I remember 
making the turn from the base to the final, but I don't remember trying to 
look for the airport or adding power or decreasing power.... I don't 
recall the engineer talking about the airspeeds at all. So it's very 
frustrating and disconcerting at night to try to lay there and think of how... 
you could be so lethargic when so many things were going on, but that's 
just the way it was. (NTSB, 1994b, p.60) 
The crew would have flown another leg from Guantanamo Bay back to 
Atlanta, if not for the accident. The flight from UGM to ATL would have been 
operated under FAR 91, which currently has no limitation on flight or duty time. 
This final leg is referred to as a "tail end ferry" because it occurs at the end of an 
FAR 121 revenue flight (or sequence of flights). Tail end ferry flights are 
typically a means of repositioning the airplane back to the home base, or 
placing it in position for the next revenue flight. The manager of the FAA Air 
Carrier Branch testified at the NTSB hearing after the AIA accident. He stated: 
. . . the most immediate concern of the FAA is the other commercial flying 
loophole that exists in the supplemental rules that permits these post Part 
121 ferry flights to be conducted under Part 91. We need to close that 
loophole.. . We are also concerned about the clarity and the possible 
ambiguity of certain requirements in the supplemental rules. (NTSB, 
1994b, p. 45) 
The probable causes of this accident as determined by the NTSB were: 
the impaired judgment, decision-making, and flying abilities of the 
captain and flight crew due to the effects of fatigue Additional factors 
contributing to the cause were the inadequacy of the flight and duty time 
regulations applied to 14 CFR, Part 121, Supplemental Air Carrier, 
international operations, and the circumstances that resulted in the 
extended flight/duty hours and fatigue of the flight crewmembers 
(NTSB, 1994b, p. 78) 
The limitations of human physiology regarding sleep, circadian rhythms, 
and fatigue were all key factors in the AIA accident. The crewmembers were 
highly motivated, experienced professionals. Their performance was limited by 
physiological capabilities, and was not a reflection of their training, experience, 
or motivation. 
Northwest Airlines - Guantanamo Bay. Cuba 
There was another fatigue related incident at Guantanamo Bay, less than 
two months after the AIA accident. On October 18,1993, the right main landing 
gear of a Northwest Airlines DC-10 struck a runway edge light, while landing on 
runway 10. Crew scheduling had called the Captain at 2330, on October 17, 
and assigned him this trip with a report time of 0210 on October 18. The 
Captain said that he "only managed to receive about one hour of rest before 
leaving for the airport after being awake all day" (NTSB, 1994b, p. 41). 
Impact of Fatigue on Pilot Performance 
The greatest fear that pilots may have regarding fatigue is that of falling 
asleep at the controls. However, most pilots recognize that there are many less 
extreme effects of fatigue that may have an equally serious impact on flight 
safety (Graeber, 1988). 
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The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) recognizes that the 
initial demonstration of proficiency and the continuation of recurrent training and 
checkrides helps to ensure that flight crewmembers maintain a high level of 
competence. However they also recognize that: 
the effectiveness with which this competence is available for use 
depends upon each crewmember being sufficiently will rested to utilize 
his capabilities efficiently. Otherwise he may not respond to the degree 
that his proficiency should ensure, but may make errors of judgment or 
action such as are associated with much lower degrees of proficiency 
than he has attained. This effect can be aggravated by various 
combinations of unfavourable operational circumstances, but the 
continuation of any task long enough under even the most favourable 
circumstances will ultimately produce fatigue and consequent 
loss of efficiency. (ICAO, 1984, p. i) 
Individuals that have been subjected to sleep deprivation in controlled 
laboratory studies "demonstrate poorer performance despite increased effort, 
and may report indifference regarding the outcome of their performance" 
(NTSB, 1994, p.47). Therefore the AIA Captain's report of feeling 'Very lethargic 
or indifferent" is typical for an individual who has experienced sleep deprivation 
or circadian disruption. 
The degree of impact of fatigue on pilot performance is determined by at 
least three core physiological factors. Accident investigators typically examine 
these factors for evidence related to fatigue: 
1. Cumulative sleep loss: It has been established in scientific literature 
that people typically require 6 to 10 hours of sleep each day to be fully alert. 
There is evidence which suggests that a loss of just 2 hours of sleep can lead to 
a significant degradation of alertness and performance. 
2. Continuous hours of wakefulness: A safety study was conducted by 
the NTSB on flight crew-involved, major accidents of U.S. Air Carriers for the 
period from 1978 through 1990. This study determined that pilots made more 
procedural and tactical decision errors after elevated periods of wakefulness 
(NTSB, 1994b). 
3. Circadian disruption (Time of day): As previously mentioned, the body 
is primed to sleep during the period from 0300 to 0500 and again from 1500 to 
1700. An individual who remains awake during these periods may experience 
a decreased level of alertness and performance. Circadian disruption may be 
defined as a failure to sleep during these periods, or an effort to sleep outside of 
these periods. 
Therefore the greatest impact of fatigue on pilot performance "would be 
expected when an individual carrying a substantial sleep debt is required to 
operate for an extended period of continuous wakefulness, and the time of the 
operation passes through a period of increased sleepiness" (NTSB, 1994b, 
p. 48). 
The AIA crew's performance was degraded by fatigue, as indicated by 
the following: 
1. Impaired decision-making skills: The crew had established a plan to 
use runway 28. It has a straightforward approach procedure, that is more 
appropriate for large, fast aircraft. However the Captain unilaterally decided to 
use runway 10. 
2. Fixation: The Captain made at least seven comments about the 
strobe light. His fixation on the strobe led to his exclusion of several sources of 
critical information. 
3. Poor judgment: The Captain elected to use 50 degrees of flaps, 
despite the fact that AlAs flight manual prohibited the use of 50 degrees of flaps 
(except for emergency purposes). He also elected to continue the approach 
after several comments from the First Officer and Flight Engineer about their 
airspeed and ability to make the landing. 
4. Slow reaction time: The crew should have reacted immediately to the 
stall warning. Their slow response to the warning was the final link in the chain 
leading to this accident. 
5. Decreased memory and mental functioning: The crewmembers had 
some difficulty remembering and interpreting crossing radials, waypoints, and 
radio frequencies. 
The Captain of the AIA DC-8 had received 7 hours of sleep in the 57 
hours prior to the accident, and had been continuously awake for 23.5 hours. 
The First Officer had received 10 hours of sleep in the 57 hours prior to the 
accident, and had been continuously awake for 19 hours. The Flight Engineer 
had received 12 hours of sleep in the 57 hours prior to the accident, and had 
been continuously awake for 21 hours. Finally, the accident occurred during 
one of the periods of maximal sleepiness - 1500 to 1700 (NTSB, 1994b). 
The worldwide airline fleet is expected to increase nearly 60% by the 
year 2010. With the current accident rate, there will be a major accident every 
week, by the year 2010. A Boeing safety engineer has found that human error 
has been the primary cause of more than 80% of the accidents (Weener, 1990). 
Adequate pilot rest is one of the primary issues that needs to be addressed, in 
order to lower the accident rate and change these projections (Pasztor, 1996). 
Federal Aviation Regulations 
Flight time limitations and rest requirements were first established in the 
1930s. These FARs placed a limit on the number of hours an airline pilot could 
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fly each day, week, month, and year, and also specified a minimum number of 
hours of rest preceding different amounts of flight time. Sixty years later these 
regulations are essentially unchanged. 
FAR 135.265 
This FAR applies to pilots flying aircraft with 30 seats or less, on domestic 
routes. The maximum total commercial flight time for these pilots is: 
1. Within any calendar year, 1200 hours. 
2. Within any calendar month, 120 hours. 
3. Within any seven consecutive days, 34 hours. 
4. Between required rest periods, 8 hours. 
The minimum required rest period (defined by the FAA as block in to block out) 
prior to flight for these pilots is: 
1. For less than 8 hours of scheduled flight time, 9 hours of rest (may be 
reduced to 8 hours of rest). 
2. During any 7 consecutive days, a 24-hour rest period. 
The maximum duty period (implied) is 16 hours. 
FAR 121.471 
This FAR applies to pilots flying aircraft with more than 30 seats, on 
domestic routes. The maximum total commercial flight time for these pilots is: 
1. Within any calendar year, 1000 hours. 
2. Within any calendar month, 100 hours. 
3. Within any seven consecutive days, 30 hours. 
4. Between required rest periods, 8 hours. 
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The minimum required rest period prior to flight for these pilots is: 
1. For less than 8 hours of scheduled flight time, 9 hours of rest (may be 
reduced to 8 hours of rest). 
2. During any 7 consecutive days, a 24-hour rest period. 
The maximum duty period (implied) is 16 hours. 
Development and Revision of FARs 
Testimony before the NTSB at a public hearing after the AIA accident, 
revealed that 'the United States and France are the only countries in the world 
that base their aviation hours of service regulations on flight time while most 
other countries base it on duty time" (NTSB, 1994b, p. 66). The ICAO 
establishes international standards and recommended practices for the safe 
operation of the international aviation system, and then monitors the member 
States for compliance. The ICAO has noted that there is significant variation in 
the manner in which member States develop and issue their flight and duty time 
limitations and rest requirements. Some States develop and issue the 
regulations at the government level, while other States permit the airlines to 
develop the rules, and then submit them to the State for approval (ICAO, 1984). 
Several attempts have been made to update and revise these 
regulations, however these attempts have failed because of the inappropriate 
strategy used by the FAA. The FAA's strategy for developing regulatory change 
is based upon input from an outside advisory committee. These committees are 
typically unable to obtain a consensus from industry management and labor 
groups, and therefore the proposed changes are usually shelved. The NTSB 
has expressed concern that "efforts to change existing regulations by means of 
the committee negotiating process are ineffective" (NTSB, 1994b, p. 66). 
The NTSB is also concerned with: 
. . . the length of time without revision of the current flight/duty time 
regulations and the continuing slowness and difficulty of the current 
regulatory review process. New evidence has become available in the 
past 20 years on fatigue, and it increasingly substantiates that fatigue is a 
more pervasive and debilitating factor in transportation safety than was 
previously realized. The Safety Board believes that the FAA should 
revise the regulations pertaining to permitted flight and duty time. (NTSB, 
1994b, p. 68) 
The FAA issued a Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) in 1995 
(NPRM 95-18). The highlights of this NPRM are provided in Appendix C. This 
proposal includes several revisions to the flight and duty limitations and rest 
requirements. The following revisions would be beneficial for the reduction of 
fatigue: 
1. Decrease duty time limit for two pilot crew from 16 hours (implied) to 
14 hours. 
2. Increase normal scheduled rest period from 9 hours to 10 hours. 
3. Increase weekly rest period from 24 hours to 36 hours. 
4. Set maximum duty period for reserve pilots based upon time from 
notification to report time. 
5. Include Part 91 flight time (training and ferry flights) in Part 121 limits. 
Additionally, the NPRM 95-18 Appendix B lists the following revisions that 
would be detrimental for the reduction of fatigue: 
1. Increase flight time limit for two pilot crew from 8 hours to 10 hours 
2. Increase weekly flight time limit from 30 hours to 32 hours. 
3. Increase annual flight time limit from 1000 hours to 1200 hours 
(ALPA, 1996). 
As with previous NPRMs, the FAA has been unable to receive a 
consensus from industry management and labor groups. The latest information 
available from the FAA indicates that the majority of this NPRM will not be 
enacted (it is possible that the provision requiring FAR Part 91 flight time to be 
included in FAR Part 121 limitations, will become a regulation). 
The NTSB recognizes that the current flight and duty time regulations rely 
on the judgment and integrity of each individual pilot. The burden of refusing a 
trip because of fatigue is placed on the pilots, because the FARs allow the 
airlines to schedule their pilots well beyond many human limitations. A fatigue 
expert called upon to help with the investigation of the AIA accident stated that 
"individuals are normally poor at recognizing their own fatigue state and tend to 
strongly underestimate it" (NTSB, 1994b, p.64). 
As previously mentioned, the CEO of AIA stated that "good" pilots were 
recognized for "pulling for the company" through support of company 
requirements, and that these "good" pilots were upgraded to the position of 
Captain, out of seniority (NTSB, 1994b). This type of upgrade policy places a 
large amount of pressure on the pilots to complete their assigned schedule, 
regardless of an unsafe level of fatigue. 
The NTSB addressed this issue after the AIA accident as follows: 
Given the pressures of the actual commercial environment, it does not 
seem realistic to rely on the crew's self assessment and willingness to 
confront company pressures as a safety mechanism to prevent the 
assignment of tired crews. The FARs set the baseline of what is 
permitted legally in hours of service, and competitive pressures make it 
likely that air carriers will operate at or near the baseline to maximize 
crew utilization and company profits. The Safety Board is concerned that 
companies are unlikely to voluntarily change their policies, or that 
individual crewmembers will take an aggressive position in the 
determination of fatigue limits; rather, it will require regulation to enact 
change to prevent the recurrence of this type of accident. (NTSB, 1994b, 
pp. 64-65) 
Flight Crew Work and Rest Scheduling 
A pairing or sequence is a pilot's schedule as published by the airline's 
crew scheduling department, however the Time Available for Rest (TAR) has 
been derived by the author as depicted in Table 1. The author's TAR is similar 
to that utilized by Weitzel (1997). 
Table 1 
Time Available for Rest (TAR) 
Layover City Home Base 
Postflight duties 
Transfer time (Airport to Hotel/Home) 
Personal hygiene and a meal (before sleep) 
Personal hygiene and a meal (after sleep) 
Transfer time (Hotel/Home to Airport) 
Preflight duties 
Subtract from total layover to derive TAR 
:15 
:30 
:45 
:45 
:30 
1:00 
3:45 
:15 
1:00 
:45 
:45 
1:00 
1:00 
4:45 
This study will examine two examples of regional airline pairings. The 
following details are provided to help facilitate the interpretation of the pairings: 
1. Departure and Arrival times are provided in local time. 
2. Block is the time scheduled from gate to gate. 
3. Duty is the time from one hour before the first departure to 15 minutes 
after the last arrival (of that particular duty period). 
4. Individual duty periods are separated by a solid line. 
5. TAR is the time available for rest (derived by subtracting 3:45 from the 
total time at the layover city or 4:45 from the total time at the pilot's home base) 
6. TARs within brackets are not part of a legal rest period, however they 
are shown as time for potential napping. 
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7. A decoding of the respective three-letter airport codes is as follows: 
ABE Allentown, PA 
ACY Atlantic City, NJ 
CLE Cleveland, OH 
DCA Washington, DC 
JFK New York, NY 
LNS Lancaster, PA 
PHL Philadelphia, PA 
RDG Reading, PA 
Continuous Duty Overnight (CDO) 
Continuous duty overnights are a very common scheduling technique. 
Some major airlines schedule a small percentage of their crews for CDOs, 
however CDOs are much more prevalent at the regional airlines. CDOs are 
legal within the current FARs, however many pilots report high levels of fatigue 
and a decreased level of safety while flying these trips. Table 2 is an example 
of a flight crew pairing utilizing CDOs. 
Table 2 
Continuous Duty Overnight (Flight Crew Pairing) 
CDO 
#1 
CDO 
#2 
CDO 
#3 
Day 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
From 
JFK 
CLE 
JFK 
DCA 
JFK 
CLE 
JFK 
DCA 
JFK 
CLE 
JFK 
DCA 
To 
CLE 
JFK 
DCA 
JFK 
CLE 
JFK 
DCA 
JFK 
CLE 
JFK 
DCA 
JFK 
Depart 
2200 
0620 
0900 
1030 
2200 
0620 
0900 
1030 
2200 
0620 
0900 
1030 
Arrive 
2355 
0810 
1005 
1135 
2355 
0810 
1005 
1135 
2355 
0810 
1005 
1135 
Block 
1: 
1: 
1-
1: 
1: 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
55 
50 
05 
05 
55 
50 
05 
05 
:55 
:50 
:05 
:05 
Duty 
14:50 
14:50 
14:50 
TAR 
[2:40] 
5:40 
[2:40] 
5:40 
[2:40] 
? 
The crew assigned to this sequence is scheduled to report to the airport 
on Day 1 at 2100 in order to complete the preflight duties associated with a 
2200 departure. One leg is flown the first night, and after 15 minutes of 
postflight duties, and 30 minutes of transfer time (airport to hotel), the crew is 
generally to the hotel by 40 minutes past midnight. Allowing 45 minutes for 
personal hygiene and a snack, the crewmembers can usually be in bed by 
0125; the result is 2:40 available for rest (TAR). The crew will have to arise at 
approximately 0405, to be in the hotel lobby by 0450, for transfer to the airport. 
The airport report time is 0520 for a 0620 departure. Scheduled flying consists 
of three legs, with a return to domicile at 1135. The crew is then released from 
duty until 2100 that day, at which point the previous sequence is repeated. 
Many regional pilots are domiciled at large cities, with major airline hub airports. 
The time required for the crew to transfer to the employee parking lot and drive 
home is typically 1 -2 hours. Another 1 -2 hours is required to reverse the 
process that night, leaving a maximum TAR of 5:40. 
The rest period provided at night (at CLE in this pairing) is not long 
enough to be considered the FAR required rest period (the minimum FAR time 
is 8 hours). Most regional airlines do provide a hotel room for their pilots to nap 
during this short rest period. However, at least one regional airline has 
threatened to stop providing hotel rooms for crews on CDOs. Anecdotally, 
these pilots have been told that because the duty period is continuous (from 
2100 until 1150 in this pairing), the airline has no obligation to provide a hotel 
room. The FAR required rest period is provided at the crew's domicile (from 
1150 until 2100 in this pairing), however as previously described, the maximum 
TAR is 5:40. The crew may not be able to take full advantage of this already 
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short time allotted for rest, either in terms of the quantity or quality of sleep, 
because the rest period has been provided during the day (Holley, 1974). 
Some regional airline pilot groups have been able to negotiate a labor 
contract restriction that limits the number of CDOs to three in a row (as shown in 
this sample pairing). Similarly, other regional pilots are scheduled for up to five 
CDOs back-to- back (a sixth consecutive CDO would exceed the limitation in 
FAR 121.471 or FAR 135.265, which requires a 24 hour rest period during any 7 
consecutive calendar days). 
The regional airlines schedule continuous duty overnights for a number 
of reasons. One of these is an attempt to save money on hotel costs. If the 
same crew that flies the last flight to CLE, also flies the first flight out in the 
morning, then only one crew incurs layover costs in that city. Most regional 
airline flight crews consist of two pilots and a flight attendant; three hotel rooms 
are required (utilizing one crew on layover requires half the costs of two crews 
on layover). However, the increased payroll costs associated with CDOs may 
more than offset the hotel savings associated with the single crew utilization. 
Appendix D has been included as a descriptor of cost efficiency associated with 
CDOs. 
The logistical issue is another reason for the existence of continuous duty 
overnights. The frequency of flights to a particular city and the type of aircraft 
used are factors. The last flight in and the first flight out may require a larger or 
smaller aircraft (gauge, in airline marketing terminology) than other daily flights 
in a city pair. Table 3 represents a typical city pair daily schedule served by 
different gauge aircraft. 
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Table 3 
Service between JFK-CLE 
3ht# 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Aircraft 
EMB 
BE2 
BE2 
BE2 
BE2 
EMB 
From 
CLE 
JFK 
CLE 
JFK 
CLE 
JFK 
To 
JFK 
CLE 
JFK 
CLE 
JFK 
CLE 
Depart 
0620 
0900 
1130 
1600 
1830 
2200 
Arrive 
0810 
1055 
1320 
1755 
2020 
2355 
Block 
1:50 
1:55 
1:50 
1:55 
1:50 
1:55 
The crew scheduling department has several options to get the crew 
assigned to Flight # 6 back to JFK: 
1. Have them work Flight # 1 the following morning (CDO). 
2. Have them deadhead on Flight # 3 or # 5 the following day (they could 
not work either of these flights because they are not qualified on a BE2, 
however this option does provide them with a legal rest period per the FARs). 
3. Have them work Flight # 1 two days later (this would result in a 30:25 
layover). 
The option usually chosen is to assign the crew to a CDO, and have them 
work the first flight out the following morning. The second option is undesirable, 
because it requires the airline to pay the crew to ride as passengers in seats 
that could otherwise be sold to paying passengers. The third option is also 
undesirable, because the crew must remain at CLE for two nights, when they 
could otherwise be flying an airplane (this would double the airline's hotel bill 
and increase staffing requirements). 
Overnight cargo pilots routinely fly schedules very similar to the CDOs 
flown by regional airline pilots. A recent study of overnight cargo flight 
operations revealed that: 
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During daytime layovers, the average sleep episode was 3 hours (41%) 
shorter than nighttime sleeps and was rated as lighter, less restorative, 
and poorer overall. Sleep was frequently split into several episodes and 
totaled 1.2 hours less per 24 hours than on pretrip days On duty 
days, reports of headaches increased by 400%, of congested nose by 
200%, and of burning eyes by 900%. (Gander et al., 1996, p. 1) 
This study demonstrated that overnight cargo operations, as with other night 
work such as CDOs, involve physiological disruption not experienced by pilots 
flying a daytime schedule. 
Multi-Day Trip 
The 4-Day trip provided in Table 4 illustrates the irregular work schedule 
faced by many regional airline pilots on a daily basis. As with the CDO, this 
pairing is legal within the current FARs, but certainly may exceed an individual's 
tolerance to fatigue. The crew assigned to this trip is scheduled to report to the 
airport at 0530 on Day 1. The duty period is scheduled to be almost 16 hours. 
The crew will complete 13 flights with a total block time of 7:45. There is one 
break in the day (0800-1010) with sufficient time for the crew to eat a meal. The 
rest of the breaks are either 20 or 30 minutes, during which the crew is required 
to complete preflight duties. 
The first duty period ends at 2120 (15 minutes after their last arrival), and 
the second duty period begins at 0535 (one hour prior to the first departure). 
This leaves a TAR of 5:45, and an FAA defined rest period of 8:15, which is 
known as a "reduced rest period." The normal rest period required by FAR 
121.471(b)(1) is "9 consecutive hours of rest for less than 8 hours of scheduled 
flight time" (FAR, 1998, p. 327). Therefore, the crew is required to receive 
compensatory rest as provided in paragraph (c)(1) of the same regulation which 
states: 
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a rest required under paragraph (b)(1) of this section may be scheduled 
for or reduced to a minimum of 8 hours if the flight crewmember is given a 
rest period of at least 10 hours that must begin no later than 24 hours 
after the commencement of the reduced rest period. (FAR, 1997, p. 327) 
Table 4 
4-Dav Flight Crew Pairing 
Day 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
From 
PHL 
RDG 
PHL 
RDG 
PHL 
ACY 
PHL 
LNS 
PHL 
ABE 
PHL 
ACY 
PHL 
ACY 
PHL 
ACY 
PHL 
ACY 
To 
RDG 
PHL 
RDG 
PHL 
ACY 
PHL 
LNS 
PHL 
ABE 
PHL 
ACY 
PHL 
ACY 
PHL 
ACY 
PHL 
ACY 
PHL 
Depart 
0630 
0725 
1010 
1105 
1210 
1305 
1410 
1505 
1610 
1720 
1830 
1925 
2030 
0635 
0740 
0835 
1120 
1215 
Arrive Block Duty TAR 
0705 
0800 
1045 
1140 
1245 
1340 
1445 
1540 
1650 
1800 
1905 
2000 
2105 
0710 
0815 
0910 
1155 
1250 
35 
35 
35 
35 
35 
35 
35 
35 
40 
40 
35 
35 
35 15:50 5:45 
35 
35 
35 
35 
35 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
PHL 
JFK 
PHL 
RDG 
PHL 
RDG 
PHL 
JFK 
PHL 
RDG 
PHL 
RDG 
PHL 
LNS 
1320 
1450 
1625 
1720 
1825 
1920 
2025 
1420 
1555 
1700 
1755 
1900 
1955 
2100 
1:00 
1:00 
35 
35 
35 
35 
35 
3 
3 
3 
LNS 
PHL 
ACY 
PHL 
ACY 
PHL 
0815 
0920 
1015 
0850 
0955 
1050 
:35 
:35 
:35 3:50 4:40 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
PHL 
JFK 
PHL 
JFK 
PHL 
ACY 
PHL 
ACY 
JFK 
PHL 
JFK 
PHL 
ACY 
PHL 
ACY 
PHL 
2015 
2145 
2325 
0545 
0720 
0815 
0920 
1015 
2115 1:00 
2250 1:05 
0025 1:00 
0650 1:05 
0755 
0850 
0955 
1050 
35 
35 
35 
35 
15:40 7:30 
[135] 
15:50 ? 
The second day includes another duty period of almost 16 hours. The 
crew will complete 12 flights with a total block time of 7:55. There is one break 
in the day (0910-1120) with sufficient time for the crew to eat a meal. The 
second duty period ends at 2115 and the third duty period begins at 0715. This 
leaves a TAR of 7:30, and an FAA defined rest period of 10:00. 
The third day is split into two separate duty periods. The first duty period 
is 3:50, including three flights with a total block time of 1:45. This duty period 
ends at 1050 and the final duty period begins later that evening at 1915, leaving 
a TAR of 4:40, and an FAA defined rest period of 8:10. 
This rest period is provided during the day, which is a significant shift to 
the crew's sleep schedule, and will cause circadian disruption. Also the crew 
just completed a rest period less than 4 hours prior to the commencement of this 
rest period. These factors will combine to create a very difficult environment for 
the crew to receive any sleep, prior to their final duty period, which is a 
continuous duty overnight. 
The final duty period is 15:50, including eight flights with a total block 
time of 6:30. There is one break in the duty period (0025-0545) with sufficient 
time for the crew to nap. The TAR is only 1:35, however the opportunity to take 
a shower and eat a meal will be helpful for completing this duty period, which 
ends at 1105 on Day 4. Their next trip pairing can not begin until at least 2105 
that night, because of the requirement for a 10 hour compensatory rest period, 
following the previous reduced rest period. 
Flight crew schedules are typically computer generated and presently 
lack the flexibility to sufficiently consider natural circadian variations and 
personal tolerance. Hawkins asserted that flight crew schedules: 
usually assume that the human is some kind of machine which can 
automatically obtain restorative benefit from a given number of hours off 
duty, regardless of when these hours are given They ignore scientific 
knowledge and inevitably lead to lowered performance during aircraft 
operation (1993, p. 79). 
24-Hour Reserve Duty 
Both major and regional airlines typically assign 10-20% of their pilots to 
reserve duty in order to maintain schedule reliability. Sick calls, pilot training, 
and mechanical, weather or ATC delays are reasons that a pilot on reserve may 
be called in to cover a trip. Some airlines have been required by their FAA POI 
to limit the reserve pilots "on-call" period to 15 hours per day. Other airlines are 
allowed to schedule their reserve pilots for 24 hour duty periods, typically for 6 
consecutive days. It is unclear why the FAA has taken this position of selective 
enforcement (which provides a competitive advantage to those airlines 
permitted to schedule pilots to 24 hour duty periods, by allowing reduced 
staffing levels). 
Several years ago, a regional airline manager questioned the FAA as to 
whether a pilot assigned to reserve status is on duty. The Assistant Chief 
Counsel at the Regulations Division of the FAA issued a legal interpretation on 
December 13,1993 which states: 
FAA interpretations have consistently defined "duty" as "actual work for 
the air carrier or the present responsibility for such should the occasion 
arise." In addition, FAA interpretations have stated that a "rest period" is 
determined prospectively, is a continuous period of time, and is a time 
period during which the flight crewmember is free from all restraint by the 
air carrier. Accordingly, any conduct by the crewmember that constitutes 
"duty" may not also be considered "rest." 
Under section 121.471(b), when a crewmember reports for a flight, you 
must look to the preceding 24 hours to determine if the pilot had received 
the required 9,10, or 11 hour rest period. Because a reserve pilot has a 
present responsibility to work if called, that pilot is not free from restraint 
and, consequently, is not receiving the rest specified in the regulation. 
(FAA, 1993, p. 1) 
Several of the largest regional and major airlines still have 24 hour reserve, 
despite this legal interpretation. These large airlines may have more power and 
influence with their individual POIs, than the smaller airlines that have been 
required to limit their reserve duty periods to 15 hours. The pilots assigned to 
24 hour reserve are unable to plan their rest periods, because they have no 
idea when crew scheduling will call to assign them a trip. A pilot may go to 
sleep at 2300, and then be awakened at midnight by a telephone call from crew 
scheduling, for a trip with a report time of 0200, and a 16 hour duty period. 
The pilots employed by airlines that limit reserve duty to 15 hour 
"windows" are able to plan their rest periods, because they know in advance 
when their rest period is scheduled. This provides the reserve pilot with an FAR 
required 9 hour rest period, prior to each 15 hour reserve window. 
NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System 
In 1975 the FAA and NASA executed a Memorandum of Agreement, 
which allows NASA to function as a third party for the receipt, processing, and 
analysis of Aviation Safety Reports. "This cooperative safety reporting program 
invites pilots, controllers, flight attendants, maintenance personnel, and other 
users of the National Airspace System (NAS), or any other person, to report to 
NASA actual or potential discrepancies and deficiencies involving the safety of 
aviation operations" (U.S. Department of Transportation, 1997, p. 1). 
The information gathered from this program is to be used by the FAA to 
determine unsafe conditions, and take any necessary corrective actions. In 
order to enhance the uninhibited flow of information from the pilots, controllers, 
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etc., the FAA has agreed that unless there is a criminal offense or accident, the 
information gathered will not be used for enforcement purposes. The FAA has 
further agreed that when an FAR has been violated, and the FAA learns of the 
violation from a source other than a NASA ASRS report, a finding of violation 
may be made, however neither a civil penalty nor certificate suspension will be 
imposed, provided a NASA ASRS report has been submitted (along with a few 
other miscellaneous conditions) (U.S. Department of Transportation, 1997). 
The program has proven to be very successful, as more than 70,000 
reports have been submitted to NASA during the period between January 1, 
1988 and March 23, 1998 (K. L. Etem, personal communication, March 23, 
1998). Several excerpts from deidentified NASA ASRS reports have been 
provided: 
We were a cabin and cockpit crew, overworked and fatigued to the point 
of unsafe conditions.... On arrival in Dallas, our Captain requested the 
crew (cockpit and cabin) be replaced due to fatigue, mental and physical. 
I called our scheduling department. Scheduler quoted from our contract 
that we had to stay on the plane for 1 hour, then work another 1 hour 
flight to Houston. I was shocked because we were at a crew base where 
they could replace us. We had been on duty at this point in excess of 14 
intense hours, and they told us to work 2 more hours! I called scheduling 
back and told them that due to our exhaustion [and] fatigue we could not 
function in an emergency and we must be replaced. Scheduling 
replaced us but my cabin crew has been unduly suspended for 7 working 
days, approximately 2 weeks of work, for making a decision for the safety 
of the passengers and our own. (NASA ASRS Accession No. 110833) 
Everyone is fatigued and 'burned out'. I know the FAA says it's legal to 
work these schedules but they are not the ones flying them. I think the 
duty regulations under Federal Aviation Regulations Part 135 should be 
changed. (NASA ASRS Accession No. 182481) 
I was about to embark on the seventh leg of a trip and had been on duty 
for more than 12 hours. My captain called in fatigued, but I did not. I was 
pressured to continue because the company president had informed my 
Chief Pilot that because I am still on (my new hire) probation that I should 
be careful not to call in fatigued or sick. Although the flight from San 
Francisco to San Luis Obispo was uneventful, when I arrived I felt as 
though I had been in a microsleep during the flight because I did not 
remember segments of it. I feel that the company should use probation 
as a means of weeding out employees who have poor performance and 
not as a means to pressure pilots to fly unrealistic schedules. As I am 
writing this I am on a trip that is two days long. The first day is normal, but 
my layover is 8:14 followed by a seven leg day that has a duty time of 
13:22. This second day is unrealistic and I am scared that if I call in 
fatigued I could lose my fob. Yet I am also scared that I will be flying 
physically and mentally tired. (NASA ASRS Accession No. 188094) 
Following a reduced rest (8 hours) after more than a 14 hour duty day, [in 
a twin turboprop commuter].... We were both extremely fatigued and 
easily distracted.... As long as Part 135 carriers are allowed to 
schedule pilots to fly fatigued they will do so. Line pilots fear using the 
word fatigue to schedulers because they fear disciplinary action. My 
company's viewpoint is that if it is legal you should be able to do it.. . . 
The only way any scheduling changes will occur is if the FAA changes its 
rest requirement policy. Right now the rest requirements are really an 
accident waiting to happen. (NASA ASRS Accession No. 206269) 
Under certain emotional strain and stress a pilot should be able to 
disqualify himself from a flight without reprisal from the company or 
management (as would be the case in our airline). (NASA ASRS 
Accession No. 214452) 
We were hungry, weak and had no opportunity to acquire a nutritional 
meal. Our judgment may have been impaired with a lack of nutritional 
sustenance. There are many trips where we fly a total of 8 hours or more 
and are on duty for 14 to 16 hours without access to a morsel of food. 
This, in my view, poses a serious decrement to safety. (NASA ASRS 
Accession No. 215225) 
We desperately need more restrictive rest requirements. Our company 
routinely uses 'reduced rest' requirements to schedule pilots. There is an 
intimidation factor which keeps the pilots flying at low performance 
standards because the company is operating within FARs (barely). It is 
frustrating to know that with proper rest these 'sloppy' procedures would 
not occur. (NASA ASRS Accession No. 239725) 
When I land, I have not eaten in 27 hours. I catch the bus to the parking 
lot feeling sick and fatigued (I had flown 9 hrs, 16 mins that day). . . . I 
complained to our Chief Pilot that we needed crew meals delivered to us. 
He said we should try to negotiate that in our next contract. Negotiate 
eating? Is this really a safe way to run an airline? The life of regional 
airline pilots has us walking around like zombies most of the time. Why 
do we have to negotiate for basic needs such as food and sleep instead 
of having FARs to protect us instead of protecting company profits. 
(NASA ASRS Accession No. 244891) 
I work for a large regional / national carrier and currently am a reserve 
captain. Our current working agreement has very little in the way of work 
rules regarding scheduling and hours of service, and thus, we are 
scheduled and flown to the maximum allowed by the FARs, which we all 
know leaves much to be desired with the reality of our circadian rhythms. 
Many people think that circadian rhythms only apply to long haul 
international pilots. However, after a number of years as both a military 
and commercial carrier pilot I've found that everyone's body needs a 
routine, and radical changes can adversely affect one's performance and 
ability to get adequate sleep during the supposed rest period.... I was 
far from peak performance and had there been a serious emergency the 
outcome may have been questionable. The FAA is mandating many 
items to enhance safety such as TCASII and GPWS, however, they seem 
to forget the most critical and complex piece of equipment on the aircraft: 
the pilot! (NASA ASRS Accession No. 254345) 
I'm writing to describe a situation pertaining to chronic fatigue and the 
constant use of reduced rest by our company.... I was unable to 
perform my duties at 100 percent due to fatigue.... I realize continuous 
duty trips are a fact of life in this business. But, scheduling continuous 
duty trips back-to-back is dangerous and should be addressed 
immediately. The first day I was on duty 23 hrs 42 mins. (NASA ASRS 
Accession No. 254490) 
We were on [the] last leg of [a] trip following a reduced rest overnight, 
preceded by a long day. We were tired! I believe our schedules are 
often too demanding and do not provide enough rest. The only reason 
there are not more fatigue related accidents is because of the 
professional and heroic job being done by pilots in this country. How 
can we be expected to be safe after long days and short nights? (NASA 
ASRS Accession No. 278642) 
This was the 13th of 14 legs The longest break was 20 minutes 
The flights were (and are) scheduled well under actual block so we are 
almost always late leaving no time to even go to the bathroom 
I sincerely believe quick, strong and complete overhaul of the commuter 
pilot duty and day regulations must be implemented before more lives 
are lost to this absurd scheduling (all commuter airlines are guilty of it). 
(NASA ASRS Accession No. 287510) 
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I can be called on at any time during my reserve or standby status and 
must respond for flight duty in a timely manner, usually within 2 hours. 
No rest period exists The FAA has defined duty as: 'either actual 
work for an air carrier or present responsibility for work should the 
occasion arise.' Under this interpretation, no time during which a pilot is 
on reserve or standby duty could be considered rest.' Additionally, an 
associate FAA administrator and legal counsel are aware of those 
violations existing, but have elected not to take action, only to survey and 
evaluate the situation. Flight managers working for my carrier are aware 
of the rules and present interpretations regarding rest periods. They are 
also aware that the FAA is taking no action. These managers are 
promoting the violations of the FARs. Usually, a reserve or standby status 
is an assigned period of from 2-6 consecutive days. Normal fatigue and 
stress induced fatigue due to this type of assignment is unsafe. The 
threat of job security and loss of pay is management's motivator. My job 
is in jeopardy if I elect not to fly when fatigued as a reserve or standby 
pilot. The public's safety is being ignored by my carrier's managers and 
the FAA. The burden to preserve safety rests totally on me alone. Our 
pilots continually fly fatigued with no alternative other than loss of job. 
(NASA ASRS Accession No. 288846) 
Following reduced rest overnight (approximately 5 hours of sleep), we 
were cleared to taxi to Runway 25, but instead we had mistakenly 
thought we were cleared to taxi to Runway 7 and crossed runways 15L & 
15R in the process.... My airline insists on continuing to schedule trips 
with less than 9 hours off duty for the overnight.... My airline's policy is 
to subtract pay for fatigue calls. This makes it difficult for $20,000. a year 
commuter pilots to take themselves off line for being too tired. (NASA 
ASRS Accession No. 289721) 
The commuter airlines schedule with many successive continuous duty 
overnights. We were on our second one following two nights of 5 hour 
rest. We were... cleared to cross runway 18R and hold short of runway 
18L. I crossed runway 18R and then continued across runway 18L. . . . 
Fatigue was the cause and as a note I will do my third consecutive duty 
overnight tonight, and by the morning, I will be more fatigued than I was 
this morning. (NASA ASRS Accession No. 294882) 
This event occurred on the second day of a 3 day trip with more than 21 
legs, and three 12 hour duty days. I'm also a reserve pilot and have no 
opportunity to establish a diurnal cycle. I was very tired and probably 
should not have been in an airplane, but this is considered normal in the 
commuter airlines.... We failed to turn on course... and failed to level 
off at 8000 feet I feel reduced rest and no diurnal cycle contributed to 
this event. (NASA ASRS Accession No. 296219). 
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We had been on a continuous duty overnight and had slept maybe 4 
hours. We were not as alert as we would have been had we slept all 
night. I feel reduced rest and continuous duty overnights should be 
eliminated (NASA ASRS Accession No. 296275) 
We were towards the end of a long 2 day trip that we ended up blocking 
with over 18 hours of flight time the crew was fatigued from an 
excessively high amount of flying coupled with a reduced rest overnight. 
(NASA ASRS Accession No. 299039) 
We currently fly continuous duty overnights... then in the same month. . . 
report and fly day trips. Your body has no time to adjust, and you end up 
flying half asleep, or getting disciplinary action if you call in fatigued. 
There should be a law against a mix of all night trips and then all day 
trips in the same month. It is not safe because the body has no time to 
adjust its sleep cycle. Rest regulations that would take into consideration 
human factors such as circadian rhythms, and sleep cycles would be a 
lot safer. . . (NASA ASRS Accession No. 303127) 
First day is 14 hours of duty, nine legs.... After 9 hours of what the regs 
call 'rest'... I was tired. It is difficult for a crewmember to determine 
fatigue. No doubt had I taken a check ride late in the first day, my 
performance would not have been all I was normally capable of. 
However, considering the repercussions of declaring myself fatigued, I 
am not likely to do so . . . . A pilot who calls fatigue often does receive 
'special attention' from management. The current duty regs are a farce. 
Duty time of 15 hours increasable to 16 is outrageous. Reduced 
rests which can be scheduled ahead of time are ludicrous.... One 
needs 9 hours in the hotel room or at home. Basically, one needs to limit 
duty to 12 hours a day. I can usually do trips like described at the 
beginning of this report, but only because I am quite experienced in the 
aircraft and am senior enough to bid enough days off to recuperate 
between trips. (NASA ASRS Accession No. 306039) 
We had extreme fatigue. The Captain had received a very late night 
phone call which caused him to get only 3 hours of sleep the previous 
night. The First Officer had received 4 hours of sleep the night before 
due to people in the adjacent room making noise all night. (NASA ASRS 
Accession No. 326033) 
I was awakened by the workers cutting the lawn outside my building.. . . 
I got 4 hours of sleep that day, none of it continuous. I have never missed 
a day of work for any reason. Now I believe that it may be better to miss 
work than to be so tired as to not know what's going on around me. 
(NASA ASRS Accession No. 339548) 
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I was so tired and it was so calm I just fell asleep. I estimate I slept for 
about 150 miles. The main factors that contributed to my sleepiness 
were flying when I would normally be asleep and having to stand around 
for hours while my plane was being worked on. . . (NASA ASRS 
Accession No. 346351) 
This was our third continuous duty overnight in a row. We got about 4 
1/2 hours of sleep the night before and that was interrupted in the middle 
of the night by a call from maintenance concerning a maintenance 
problem with the aircraft. . . (NASA ASRS Accession No. 351500) 
I departed from a parallel taxiway instead of the runway. I never thought I 
could ever do such a stupid, unsafe maneuver - I'm a professional! 
Leading factor: fatigue.... We had already been up past 24 hours even 
though technically we were legal as far as duty time goes. (NASA ASRS 
Accession No. 356913) 
My purpose for this report [is] a look at the human performance 
considerations. Consider the following: I have no autopilot on the 
BA3200. All flying is manual. No yaw damper, in moderate turbulence. . . 
aircraft yaws so much that you are exhausted once reaching destination. 
No flight attendant. Presence of a flight attendant assures me that at 
least the passengers are being taken care of and are seated with seat 
belts on. Many of the BA3200s have poorly maintained pressurization 
systems and must operate manually... adding to workload 
Schedules are sometimes very unsafe. Example: 15.2 hours of duty, 9.2 
hours block (legal due to weather delay), 5.9 hours of which were hard 
IFR in icing. I realize that all of this is legal but it just doesn't make it safe. 
As a professional pilot I always desire and strive for standardization and 
good judgment. Fatigue insidiously destroys both. I readily admit that I 
did not call in fatigued when I should have. But since there is little policy 
to protect flight crews from losing our jobs from just one call-in, I feel 
almost no choice but to complete the trip. (NASA ASRS Accession No. 
360184) 
I am filling out this form not because of something that happened, but 
rather because of a potential disaster. I am very concerned of pilot 
fatigue, not only for myself, but of my fellow pilots and my passengers. 
As a commuter airline pilot, we are expected to fly, and the schedules are 
written to the point of maximum physical capabilities.... We are 
constantly putting in 8 or more hours of flight time and working 16 hour 
shifts a day. Somehow, this is legal. Working 16 hours a day is twice 
that of the normal 9-5 job. How can the FAA feel this is safe? We are 
responsible for many lives, yet we are allowed to work longer hours than 
truck drivers! At the end of a 16 hour shift, and 8 hours of flying, my mind 
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is mentally fatigued and my motor skills and reflex abilities, as well as 
decision making abilities, all suffer. My last leg the other night of a 15 
hour shift resulted in setting off the terrain alert on the GPWS and stall 
warning horn on landing. I thought to myself, 'I should not be flying.' The 
FAA needs to change these regulations to lower the maximum time on 
duty. Certain airlines, such as the one I fly for, stretch these regulations 
to maximum when creating the schedule, rather than creating safe 
schedules. (NASA ASRS Accession No. 371453) 
The preceding excerpts were extracted from safety reports that were 
voluntarily submitted to NASA. Therefore it cannot be assumed that these 
statements represent an unbiased perspective of the considered issues. 
Nevertheless, the high frequency of reports that mention CDOs, reduced rest, 
and inadequate FARs as causes of fatigue, indicate that these are recurrent 
trouble spots. "In spite of limitations in the system for some kinds of research, 
incident reports are extremely informative with respect to locating problem 
areas in specific parts of the aviation system'7 (Kanki & Palmer, 1993, p. 104). 
CHAPTER III 
METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
This descriptive study was conducted during a 7 month period beginning 
with the Winter of 1998 and ending during the Summer of the same year. A 
field study was conducted in January of 1998, primarily to gain feedback for the 
purpose of developing and improving the instrument. A 55% return rate was 
somewhat disappointing, however the subjects chosen for the field study were 
all graduate students with little or no experience in the regional airline industry, 
and therefore may not have had much interest in the topic of pilot fatigue in the 
regional airline industry. A higher return rate was anticipated from the subjects 
chosen for the actual study, who were all active regional airline pilots. (The field 
study cover letter and questionnaire in its entirety, is Appendix E of this text.) 
Methods 
The results of the January 1998 field study were reported and a decision 
was made to continue with the study by having a panel of experts review the 
instrument. The panel was chosen based upon their expertise concerning 
safety and human factors within the aviation industry. Three experts (Don Hunt 
of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, John Young of Purdue University, and 
John Piercy of a large U.S. regional airline) agreed to review the instrument for 
content validity and were also invited to make recommendations on the format, 
style, clarity, and conciseness. The expert interpretations of the survey items 
were important because "if experts read something into an item [that the 
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researcher] did not plan to include, subjects completing a final scale might do 
likewise" (DeVellis, 1991, p.75). 
The Instrument 
Clarity and conciseness have an impact on reliability "because an 
ambiguous or otherwise unclear item, to a greater degree than a clear item can 
reflect factors extraneous to the latent variable" (DeVellis, 1991, p.75). The 
expert reviewers pointed out several items with problematic wording, and also 
pointed out "ways of tapping the phenomenon that [the researcher had] failed to 
include" (p.76). Based upon the input from the panel of experts, several 
modifications were made to the instrument. Four of the Likert scale items were 
modified for clarity, and another item was added concerning reserve duty. The 
demographic items, numbers 12-16, were left unchanged; and two of the 
remaining questions were modified for clarity. The four page format was left 
unchanged. 
The research questions addressed in this study asked: Within the U.S. 
regional airline industry: (a)What are the causes of pilot fatigue? and (b) What is 
the impact of fatigue on pilot performance? The instrument contained several 
potential causes of pilot fatigue and provided the subject with the opportunity 
(using a five point Likert scale; "strongly disagreed", "disagree=2", 
"undecided=3", "agree=4", and "strongly agree=5") to address these potential 
causes. The subjects were able to address the impact of fatigue on pilot 
performance in several of the Likert scale items. The subjects also had the 
opportunity to estimate the number and severity of fatigue-related errors which 
they had made in their previous 80 hours and 500 hours of flight time. The 
cover letter and instrument in its entirety, is Appendix F of this text. 
Subjects 
The determination of the causes of pilot fatigue and the impact of 
fatigue on pilot performance within the regional airline industry was partially 
accomplished by a self-administered survey of three groups of U.S. regional 
air carrier line pilots. There are approximately 30 regional air carriers in the 
U.S. which fly aircraft having between 19-70 passenger seats. These regional 
air carriers employ more than 13,000 pilots, with approximately half of these 
being Captains and half being First Officers. Three regional airlines (groups) 
were chosen as a representative sample of the regional air carriers. The total 
number of subjects chosen to represent the three groups of U.S. regional air 
carrier pilots was 150: (a) 50 line pilots from Airline #1, (b) 50 line pilots from 
Airline #2, and (c) 50 line pilots from Airline #3. 
Members of NASA's Fatigue Countermeasures Program are currently 
conducting a research study to identify and quantify the factors that may 
contribute to fatigue, sleep, and circadian disruption in regional air carrier 
operations. Their subjects include regional airline pilots, as well as 
management personnel, and crew schedulers. The ultimate goal of 
NASA's study is similar to this study, which is to use the results to make 
recommendations that may help to minimize the fatigue, sleep loss, and 
circadian disruption experienced by regional airline pilots. (NASA Fatigue 
Countermeasures Program, 1998) 
Procedures 
The three regional air carriers were somewhat randomly chosen from 
three different regions of the U.S. For bias control, the researcher's previous 
regional air carrier employers were not chosen for this study. One pilot was 
selected from each of the three chosen regional air carriers to distribute the 
survey packets. 
The survey packets were completed during the third week of March 1998. 
Each packet consisted of a cover letter, one instrument, and a self-addressed, 
stamped envelope for the return of the completed instrument. The 150 packets 
were divided evenly into three boxes and express-mailed from Florida to the 
home address of each selected pilot at the three chosen regional air carriers. 
During the first week of April 1998 the researcher confirmed that the three 
selected pilots had distributed their respective 50 survey packets (25 to 
Captains and 25 to First Officers). The cover letters enclosed with each packet 
included a request for the subjects to return the completed survey by April 30, 
1998. 
The majority of the instruments were received by the researcher during 
the last two weeks of April 1998. However, perhaps due to the Easter holiday 
and the IRS imposed tax return deadline, completed instruments continued to 
be received until the second week of May 1998. The researcher was able to 
distinguish the returned instruments according to group by observing the 
postmark on the return envelope (the groups were in three distinct regions of 
the U.S.). The final return rates were as follows: (a) The pilots at the first airline 
returned 26 of 50 = 52%; (b) the pilots at the second airline returned 24 of 50 = 
48%; and (c) the pilots at the third airline returned 29 of 50 = 58%. The total 
return rate was 79 of 150 = 52.7%. 
The following chapter of this text, the Analysis of Data, addresses both 
the quantitative and qualitative results of the research. The researcher's initial 
consideration of the appropriate treatment of the quantitative data included the 
use of factor analysis. However, it was determined that the number of variables 
49 
to be considered was too small for the use of factor analysis (Kachigan, 1991; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). 
The quantitative data (with the exception of the demographic items) was 
determined to be ordinal data; therefore, the data was treated with 
nonparametric statistics. Specifically, the powerful Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
goodness of fit test and the Spearman's rank order correlation test were utilized, 
in order to avoid being wasteful of information (Siegel, 1956). 
In addition to the quantitative data gathered by the instrument in support 
of the causes of pilot fatigue and the impact on pilot performance within the 
regional airline industry, "a set of qualitative remarks (data) have been collected 
from the comments sections of the instruments" (Weitzel, 1997, p. 69). These 
qualitative remarks are included in Chapter IV. 
CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS OF DATA 
The final quantitative data set totaled 79 cases from the three groups (26 
from Airline #1, 24 from Airline #2, and 29 from Airline #3) with 31 variables 
(including three variables derived by the researcher, as discussed later in this 
chapter). The data was analyzed with the Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS) in a personal computer. 
The cover letter included with the instrument instructed the subjects to 
feel free to skip any question that they would rather not answer. This statement 
was included because of the sensitive nature of several of the items which dealt 
with errors committed by the subjects and violation of the FARs. This resulted in 
68 of 2449 = 2.8%, missing values within the data set. The cases which had 
variables with missing values have been omitted (listwise deletion) during 
specific data analyses. 
The instrument (see appendix F) included three types of questions to be 
answered by the subject, followed by a full page for qualitative comments. The 
first was a set of 11 items that sought the opinions of the subjects on a five-point 
Likert scale. These 11 scale questions addressed some causes of pilot fatigue 
and the impact of fatigue on pilot performance. The second was a set of five 
demographic questions. Personal questions of a subjective nature regarding 
human fatigue, regional airline safety, and FAR violations comprised the third 
and last set of twelve items. 
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Demographics 
A summary of the demographic variables is an appropriate starting point 
for the analysis of the data. The dichotomous gender variable was determined 
to be insignificant to this study. A Vice-President of Women in Aviation has 
stated that females comprise 4-5% of the U.S. commercial air carrier pilot 
population (S. Anderson, personal communication, July 27, 1998). Females 
comprised only 2.5% of the total participants in this study; thus the gender 
variable has received very little consideration. A group means comparison of 
the four remaining demographic variables is depicted in Table 5 (the standard 
deviations have been parenthesized). 
Table 5 
Means Comparison of Four Demographic Variables 
Regional 
Airline 
Airline 
#1 
(n=26) 
Airline 
#2 
(n=24) 
Airline 
#3 
(n=29) 
Chronological 
Age 
in Years 
29.77 
(5.09) 
33.04 
(6.98) 
30.97 
(4.20) 
Total 
Flight Time 
Hours 
3184.62 
(1808.41) 
5791.67 
(4808.14) 
4703.45 
(1641.75) 
Regional 
Flight Time 
Hours 
1870.19 
(1566.56) 
4000.00 
(4133.85) 
2898.14 
(1630.88) 
Flight 
Deck 
Position 
16 Captains 
10 F/Os 
7 Captains 
17F/Os 
17 Captains 
12 F/Os 
Group Demographic Differences 
Aircraft fleet types and pilot salaries are two factors that may have 
contributed to several of the group differences. Airline #1 utilizes a fleet of all 
turboprop aircraft, in contrast to the fleets of Airlines #2 and #3, which are 
comprised of both turboprop and jet aircraft. Accordingly, the pilot salaries are 
higher at Airlines #2 and #3. Inspection and SPSS analysis of Table 5 
revealed the following group demographic differences. 
Chronological Age. The pilots at Airline #1 were younger than the pilots 
at both Airline #2 and Airline #3. This might be expected because of the larger, 
more complex aircraft being flown at Airline #2 and #3 (as compared to the fleet 
at Airline #1). The airlines which fly larger aircraft typically demand more 
experience, which comes with age. The range for all of the participants was 
"22" to "50" years of age. 
Total Flight Time. A common measure of a pilot's experience is total 
flight hours. The pilots at Airline #2 and Airline #3 have significantly more total 
flight time than the pilots at Airline #1. The range for all of the participants was 
"900" to "17,800" hours of flight time. 
Regional Flight Time. Regional airline pilots may fly up to 1200 hours 
per year according to the FARs. They typically fly somewhat less, with 1000 
hours per year being common. The pilots at Airline #2 and Airline #3 have 
significantly more regional airline flight hours than the pilots at Airline #1. The 
range for all of the participants was "125" to "13,800" hours of regional flight 
time. 
Flight Deck Position. The total participants included a nearly equal 
sample of 40 Captains and 39 First Officers. However, there is a significant 
difference within the group from Airline #2, with 7 Captains and 17 First Officers. 
Likert Scale Items 
The subjects were provided with the opportunity (using a five point Likert 
scale, from "strongly disagree = 1" to "strongly agree = 5") to address potential 
causes of fatigue. The subjects were also requested to address the impact of 
fatigue on pilot performance in several of the Likert scale items. 
Iteml 
The researcher began this study with the belief that fatigue negatively 
impacts pilot performance. The participants agreed with this belief as reflected 
by the high mean responses from all three airlines, presented in Figure 1. 
1.00 2.00 3.00 
Regional Airline 
Figure 1. Fatigue has a negative impact on pilot performance. 
Item 2 
Human errors made by pilots on the flight deck are one manifestation of 
fatigue induced performance degradation. Therefore, this item was closely 
related to the first item, and the participant's responses were once again very 
high, as revealed in Figure 2. The item did not specify the severity of human 
errors on the flight deck, which can range anywhere from a missed radio call to 
stalling the airplane (as was the case in the AIA and Continental Express 
accidents). 
Figure 2. Fatigue is a contributing factor to human errors on the flight deck. 
Item 3 
This item allowed the participants to expand on their view of human 
errors on the flight deck by relating pilot errors to regional airline safety. The 
mean response from each group was consistently somewhere between "agree" 
and "strongly agree," as displayed in Figure 3. 
5.00 
1.00 2.00 3.00 
Regional Airline 
Figure 3. Fatigue-related human errors result in a decreased level of regional 
airline safety. 
Item 4 
This item provided the opportunity for the participants to express their 
opinion about the relationship between fatigue-related human errors and FAR 
violations. Some typical FAR violations include non-compliance with a 
clearance from Air Traffic Control (altitude, heading, or speed assignment), 
descent below decision height or minimum descent altitude during an 
instrument approach, and flight into restricted or prohibited airspace. The mean 
response was between ''agree'7 and "strongly agree," and was consistent from 
all three groups, as shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Fatigue-related human errors have led to violations of FARs. 
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Item 5 
Most regional airlines utilize the FARs pertaining to flight time limitations 
and rest requirements as limitations for their pilot schedules. Some regional 
airline pilot groups have been able to negotiate more restrictive limitations. The 
participants were asked if the existing FARs were adequate for the prevention of 
fatigue. The average response for group #1 was "disagree," while group #2 
and group #3 scored between "disagree'7 and "strongly disagree," as presented 
in Figure 5. 
1.00 2.00 3.00 
Regional Airline 
Figure 5. The existing FARs pertaining to flight time limitations and rest 
requirements, provide adequate rest for the prevention of fatigue. 
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Item 6 
The researcher began this study with the belief that Continuous Duty 
Overnights create a great challenge to human limitations. When asked if 
Continuous Duty Overnights cause a high level of fatigue and a decreased level 
of safety, the participants agreed with the researcher's belief. The average 
response from all three groups was between "agree" and "strongly agree," as 
displayed in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Continuous Duty Overnights (Stand-ups, High-speeds) cause a high 
level of fatigue, and a decreased level of safety. 
1.00 2.00 3.00 
Item 7 
Many regional airlines schedule their pilots for trips with "reduced rest" 
layovers. These rest periods are less than the normal length of time specified 
by the FARs. The participants were asked if reduced rest layovers cause a high 
level of fatigue and a decreased level of safety. Reduced rest is a "hot" issue 
with many regional airline pilots, and this is apparent from the average 
response from group #1 and group #2 between "agree" and "strongly agree," 
and from group #3, "agree," as shown in Figure 7. 
1.00 2.00 
Regional Airline 
3.00 
Figure 7. Trips scheduled with "reduced rest" cause a high level of fatigue, and 
a decreased level of safety. 
Item 8 
Some regional airlines schedule their pilots for more than twelve 
departures and arrivals per day. The pilot's workload is higher in a terminal 
environment than it is at cruise, and this higher workload requires greater focus 
and concentration by the pilots. The participants consistently agreed with the 
statement "departures and arrivals demand intense concentration, and 
contribute to an increased level of fatigue," as presented in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8. Departures and arrivals demand intense concentration, and 
contribute to an increased level of fatigue. 
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Item 9 
This item was modeled after the duty limitations and rest requirements 
observed by some countries other than the U.S. An increased rest period may 
help to overcome the fatigue associated with a duty day that includes a large 
number of departures and arrivals. The average response to the proposal for 
an increased rest period before and after a duty day with six or more departures 
and arrivals, was consistently between "undecided" and "agree," as shown in 
Figure 9. 
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Figure 9. Duty days that include six or more departures and arrivals, should be 
preceded, and followed by a rest period two hours longer than normal. 
Item 10 
The FAR interpretation provided by the Assistant Chief Counsel at the 
Regulations Division of the FAA is in agreement with the statement that reserve 
duty is not rest. A rest period must be determined prospectively, and is a time 
period during which the flight crewmember is free from all restraint by the air 
carrier. The participants also agreed with this statement, as presented in Figure 
10. 
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Figure 10. Reserve "duty" is not "rest", and therefore a pilot on 24-hour reserve 
status has not received a rest period as required by FAR 121.471. 
Item 11 
Some airlines have been required by their FAA POI to limit the reserve 
pilots "on-call" period to 15 hours per day, while other airlines are allowed to 
schedule their reserve pilots for 24 hour duty periods. The pilots assigned to 
24-hour reserve are unable to plan their rest periods, because they have no 
idea when crew scheduling will call to assign them a trip. The airlines chosen 
for this study either have reserve "windows" or no reserve duty at all. Therefore, 
the participants were unable to answer this item from current experience. The 
average response was consistently between "undecided" and "agree," as 
shown in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11. 24-hour reserve causes a high level of fatigue, and a decreased 
level of safety. 
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Kolmoaorov-Smirnov Test of Goodness of Fit 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test was utilized as a nonparametric test 
of significance. This test is similar to the chi square test in that it makes a 
comparison between the actual and expected (if the groups were equal) 
proportions observed in a study. Siegel and Castellan (1988) asserted that the 
"Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is more powerful in all cases than the chi-square 
test" (p. 151). In 1975, Ostle and Mensing also provided support for this test by 
stating that "since the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is more powerful than the chi-
square test, its use is to be encouraged" (p. 489). 
The researcher derived three demographic variables to assist in the 
goodness of fit test. A chronological age variable was derived and labeled as 
Age: Above or Below 40 (the age of 40 years was chosen because it is the 
approximate midpoint of a pilot's career). A total flight time variable was derived 
and labeled as Fit Hours: Above or Below 5000 (the total flight time of 5000 
hours was chosen because it is the approximate value at which many regional 
airline pilots transition to the major airlines). A regional airline flight time 
variable was derived and labeled as Rgl Hours: Above or Below 3000 (the 
regional airline flight time of 3000 hours was chosen because it is the 
approximate value at which many regional airline pilots transition to the major 
airlines). The remaining two demographic variables were analyzed without 
derivation. 
The critical value for the K-S test is referred to as Z by SPSS. This value 
is synonymous with the statistic D utilized by Siegel (1988). The critical Z at 
alpha=.05 was determined by SPSS for each of the five demographic variables, 
and has been presented with the Z values for questions 1-11, in Tables 6 and 7. 
Table 6 
K-S Test for Questions 1 -6 
m + n Critical Z 
Variable =N (a =.05) Q_01 Q_02 Q_03 Q_04 Q_05 Q_06 
.392 .458 .196 .883 .392 .261 
Age: 
Above or 
Below 40 
Fit Hours: 
Above or 
Below 5000 
Rgl Hours: 
Above or 
Below 3000 
Flight Deck 
Position 
Gender 
6+72 
=78 
25+53 
=78 
29+49 
=78 
40+38 
=78 
76+2 
=78 
.578 
.330 
.319 
.308 
.974 
.205 .361 .345 .442 .743 .174 
.342 .517 .201 1.141 1.048 .297 
.192 .720 .436 .796 .941 .889 
.220 .257 .110 .129 .863 .147 
Table 7 
K-S Test for Questions 7-11 
m + n Critical Z 
= N (a =.05) Q_07 Q_08 Q_09 Q_10 Q_11 Variable 
Age: 
Above or 
Below 40 
Fit Hours: 
Above or 
Below 5000 
Rgl Hours: 
Above or. 
Below 3000 
Flight Deck 
Position 
Gender 
6+72 
=78 
25+53 
=78 
29+49 
=78 
40+38 
=78 
76+2 
=78 
.578 .686 .392 .523 .098 .163 
.330 .743 .395 .404 .603 .376 
.319 .814 .339 .078 1.081 .862 
.308 .703 .500 .633 1.481 .743 
.974 .239 .294 .478 .771 .551 
The K-S significance of the five dichotomous variables presented in 
Tables 6 and 7 is discussed in the Conclusions Chapter of this text. 
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Subjective Items 
These self report items were conservatively treated as ordinal data. The 
subjects were provided with the opportunity to address personal fatigue-related 
issues, including sleep requirements, sleep actually achieved, and the impact of 
fatigue on their performance in the cockpit. 
Item 17 
The first subjective item addressed the personal issue of sleep normally 
required to be fully rested. The average response was consistent between 
airline #1 and airline #2, and slightly higher within airline #3, as presented in 
Figure 12. 
1.00 2.00 
Regional Airline 
3.00 
Figure 12. How many hours of sleep do you need to be fully rested? 
Item 18 
This item asked the subjects to provide the average number of hours that 
they are able to sleep while on a nine-hour rest period provided some time 
between the hours of 2100 and 0900 local time. The average responses were 
relatively consistent between the groups as shown in Figure 13. 
1.00 2.00 
Regional Airline 
3.00 
Figure 13. How many hours are you able to sleep (average), while on a nine-
hour rest period provided between the hours of 21:00 and 09:00 (local)? 
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Item 19 
Continuous Duty Overnights typically result in the crew's rest period 
being provided some time between the hours of 0900 and 2100. The number of 
hours of sleep reported by the participants is not surprisingly much lower during 
this time period, than the time period specified in the previous item. Group #2 
reported a significantly lower number than group #1 and group #3, as displayed 
in Figure 14. 
6.0% 
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Regional Airline 
3.00 
Figure 14. How many hours are you able to sleep (average), while on a nine-
hour rest period provided between the hours of 0900 and 2100 (local) ? 
Item 20 
The actual time available for rest is less than the duration of the rest 
period provided to the flight crew. Therefore the researcher expected the 
participant's responses to this item to be significantly higher than the responses 
provided to item 17 (which inquired of the subject's normal sleep requirements). 
This was the case, with all three groups reporting significantly higher values to 
this item, compared to item 17, as presented in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15. How many hours should the minimum rest period be, in order to 
allow adequate sleep for the minimization of fatigue? 
Item 21(a) 
This item provided the subjects with the opportunity to report the 
percentage of time in which they have flown fatigued during their previous 80 
hours of flight time (typically a period of approximately 30 days). Fatigue is a 
matter of degree, and this item did not attempt to specify a certain degree of 
fatigue. The pilots from airline #2 reported the highest percentage as shown in 
Figure 16. 
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Figure 16. What percentage of time have you felt fatigued during your last 80 
hours of flight time? 
Item 2Kb) 
This item provided the subjects with the opportunity to report the number 
of fatigue related errors committed during their previous 80 hours of flight time. 
Errors are a matter of degree, and this item did not attempt to specify a certain 
severity of error. The pilots from airline #3 reported the highest average 
number, as shown in Figure 17. 
1.00 2.00 
Regional Airline 
3.00 
Figure 17. How many fatigue related errors have you made during your last 80 
hours of flight time? 
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Item 21(c) 
This item was a follow-up question related to item 21(b). The researcher 
anticipated that many of the errors reported in item 21 (b) would be minor. 
Therefore, this item specifies only those errors that resulted in a decreased level 
of safety. Group #3 reported the highest average number, as presented in 
Figure 18. 
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Figure 18. How many of these errors resulted in a decreased level of safety? 
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Item 21(d) 
This item was a follow-up question related to items 21(b) and 21(c), and 
requested the participants to report the number of errors that led to a violation of 
the FARs during their previous 80 hours of flight time. The researcher realized 
that a question referring to FAR violations is a sensitive issue, and was not 
surprised that several of the participants chose to skip this particular item. The 
responses provided by the three groups were somewhat consistent, and are 
displayed in Figure 19. 
1.00 2.00 
Regional Airline 
3.00 
Figure 19. How many of these errors led to a violation of the FARs? 
Item 22(a) 
This item provided the subjects with the opportunity to report the 
percentage of time in which they have flown fatigued during their previous 500 
hours of flight time (typically a period of approximately 180 days). Fatigue is a 
matter of degree, and this item did not attempt to specify a certain degree of 
fatigue. The pilots from airline #2 reported the highest percentage as shown in 
Figure 20. 
1.00 2.00 3.00 
Regional Airline 
Figure 20. What percentage of time have you felt fatigued during your last 500 
hours of flight time? 
Item 22(b) 
This item provided the subjects with the opportunity to report the number 
of fatigue related errors committed during their previous 500 hours of flight time. 
Errors are a matter of degree, and this item did not attempt to specify a certain 
severity of error. The pilots from airline #2 reported the highest average 
number, as shown in Figure 21. 
1.00 2.00 
Regional Airline 
3.00 
Figure 21. How many fatigue related errors have you made during your last 
500 hours of flight time? 
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Item 22(c) 
This item was a follow-up question related to item 22(b). The researcher 
anticipated that many of the errors reported in item 22(b) would be minor. 
Therefore, this item specifies only those errors that resulted in a decreased level 
of safety. Group #2 reported the highest average number, as presented in 
Figure 22. 
1.00 2.00 
Regional Airline 
3.00 
Figure 22. How many of these errors resulted in a decreased level of safety? 
77 
Item 22(d) 
This item was a follow-up question related to items 22(b) and 22(c), and 
requested the participants to report the number of errors that led to a violation of 
the FARs during their previous 500 hours of flight time. Once again, the 
researcher realized that a question referring to FAR violations is a sensitive 
issue, and was not surprised that several of the participants chose to skip this 
particular item. Group #1 reported the highest average number, as presented in 
Figure 23. 
1.00 2.00 
Regional Airline 
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Figure 23. How many of these errors led to a violation of the FARs? 
Subjective Data Correlations 
The Spearman rank order correlation, also known as Spearman's rho, 
was selected as an appropriate nonparametric statistic to identify potential 
correlations among the subjective data. The resultant correlation matrix is 
Appendix G. 
Some of the correlations that were determined to be significant by the 
Spearman's rho test were expected by the researcher and are not significant to 
this study. For example the correlations between age, experience, and flight 
deck position were determined by SPSS to be significant (a=.05), however they 
do not warrant specific consideration, and have been omitted from the 
correlation matrix. The net result was 15 statistically significant correlations: 
1. Errors Last 30 Days - - Fatigued Last 30 Days. 
2. Errors Last 30 Days - - Safety Decrements Last 30 Days. 
3. Safety Decrements Last 30 Days - - Sleep Achieved 0900-2100. 
4. FAR Violations Last 30 Days - - Minimum Rest Period. 
5. FAR Violations Last 30 Days - - Safety Decrements Last 30 Days. 
6. FAR Violations Last 30 Days - - Fatigued Last 30 Days. 
7. Minimum Rest Period - - Safety Decrements Last 180 Days. 
8. Errors Last 180 Days - - Safety Decrements Last 180 Days. 
9. Fatigued Last 180 Days - - Safety Decrements Last 180 Days. 
10. FAR Violations Last 180 Days - - Minimum Rest Period. 
11. FAR Violations Last 180 Days - - Fatigued Last 180 Days. 
12. FAR Violations Last 180 Days - - Safety Decrements Last 180 Days. 
13. Fatigued Last 180 Days - - Minimum Rest Period. 
14. Sleep Normally Required - - Sleep Achieved 2100-0900. 
15. Minimum Rest Period - - Sleep Achieved 2100-0900. 
Qualitative Data 
The last page of the instrument provided a space for the participant's 
comments. Many of the participants chose to provide qualitative remarks. The 
final number of instruments which contained comments were as follows: 
(a) The pilots at the first airline included comments in 10 of 26 = 39%; (b) the 
pilots at the second airline included comments in 11 of 24 = 46%; and (c) the 
pilots at the third airline included comments in 13 of 29 = 45%. The total 
comment rate was 34 of 79 = 43%. 
In 1994, Miles and Huberman provided support for the use of qualitative 
data in a growing number of basic disciplines and applied fields: 
Qualitative data are sexy. They are a source of well-grounded, rich 
descriptions and explanations of processes in identifiable local contexts. 
With qualitative data one can preserve chronological flow, see precisely 
which events led to which consequences, and derive fruitful 
explanations.... Words, especially organized into incidents or stories, 
have a concrete, vivid, meaningful flavor that often proves far more 
convincing to a reader... than pages of numbers, (p. 1) 
Many of the comments provided by the participants were very similar to 
the NASA ASRS excerpts already included in Chapter II. Therefore, the 
researcher has provided the following selected excerpts in an attempt to avoid 
redundancy: 
We are a 121 Flag Carrier with an exemption to operate under the duty 
time/flight time rules of 135.265. One level of safety has not been 
achieved.... Our rest starts not at the hotel, but calling off duty at the 
airport. By the time one gets to the hotel (or home) and has dinner the 
sleep is reduced by 30% of the scheduled rest. Also, remember that 
travel to & from the airport is considered rest under FAR 135. (Group 1, 
Case 1) 
Rest periods should not be reduced. (Group 1, Case 4) 
I think that the way regional airlines are allowed to schedule is insane if 
safety is the issue. I often fly 12 leg days with just 9 hours of rest with 
another 14 hour duty day following - totally unsafe! I'm exhausted, 
especially on the 3rd and 4th day of a series. (Group 1, Case 7) 
If the commuters all had to switch to Part 121 to achieve "one level of 
safety," then why are they allowed to operate under Part 135 rest 
requirements? (Group 1, Case 8) 
. . . What about fatigue during initial, recurrent, or upgrade training? I still 
do not know how I managed to function after training until 4 or 5 AM 
every day, trying to sleep a couple of hours, study again, then head out to 
fly at 1 A M . . . . There are no written rest requirements for airline training 
duty times! (Group 1, Case 9) 
What are the effects of crewmembers who are fatigued and starving? 
(Group 1, Case 10) 
Stand up overnights are the worst type of flying. (Group 2, Case 28) 
Too tired to write comments. (Group 2, Case 29) 
Maybe you should send a copy of the results to the FAA. They seem to 
think that because it is legal it is safe. The regional airlines use this to 
their advantage. (Group 2, Case 31) 
Most regional airlines won't do anything about the rest problem until an 
aircraft crashes or the FAA changes the rules. (Group 2, Case 32) 
After the second CDO rest period, my fatigue seems to increase rapidly. 
By the 4th CDO in a row, I am a zombie! (Group 2, Case 33) 
Fatigue is, without a doubt, a real problem at regional airlines. (Group 2, 
Case 36) 
While on a 4 day trip during 4 days of intense weather a go-around was 
initiated. Confusion led to a loss of control and unusual attitude. In 
13,000 hours of flying I have never "lost it." This was completely due to 
fatigue [and] was in a CRJ with 50 people in back. Co-pilot took control 
and I thanked him later. I know my personal abilities are above average 
but in this case I was... dead tired. This is a very serious issue. 
(Group 2, Case 37) 
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I feel that fatigue is the single most dangerous part of the regional airline 
industry. The lack of adequate rest is intensified by the lack of adequate 
breaks for a balanced diet. It is common for us to have 10 or more hours 
between breaks long enough to eat a meal. (Group 3, Case 51) 
Many duties magnify even minor fatigue. . . (Group 3, Case 53) 
When I am fatigued, I make more mistakes... (Group 3, Case 54) 
. . . I believe CDOs should be illegal. (Group 3, Case 57) 
Fatigue is like the weather, everyone studies it and talks about it, but no 
one does anything about it. (Group 3, Case 59) 
I think something has to be done about duty days extending beyond 14 
hours. Our company makes us continue past 14 hours whenever 
weather or maintenance has delayed us. It's up to us to finally say 
"when." (Group 3, Case 60) 
Rest regulations are obviously inadequate, hence the need for union 
contracts to address (or try to address) this problem. Inadequate rest at 
the regional level is unfortunately a fact of life. One that is in dire need of 
attention!!! (Group 3, Case 61) 
I feel that the number of departures/arrivals correlates to my fatigue.... 
The added mental awareness required for departures/arrivals is 
tiresome... extra rest would help out. (Group 3, Case 63) 
As with the NASA ASRS reports, it cannot be assumed that these 
statements represent an unbiased perspective of the considered issues. 
Nevertheless, the high frequency of comments that mentioned CDOs, reduced 
rest, and inadequate FARs as causes of fatigue, indicate that these are 
recurrent trouble spots within the regional airline industry. The quantitative and 
qualitative data will be further discussed in the conclusions provided in Chapter 
V of this text. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
The original research questions, restated, are: Within the U.S. regional 
airline industry, (a) What are the causes of pilot fatigue? and (b) What is the 
impact of fatigue on pilot performance? Review of the literature and the 
analysis of the quantitative and qualitative data from the surveys has allowed 
the formulation of some answers to these research questions, which have been 
provided within the following conclusions: 
1. The practice of scheduling pilots for trips planned with "reduced rest" 
(less than the normally required 9 hours), stretches human limitations and leads 
to pilot fatigue. "We have seen repeated instances of poor scheduling of work 
and rest periods in all transportation modes that have or might have affected 
adversely the performance of operating personnel" (NTSB, 1996, p.11). Of the 
participants who expressed an opinion on this subject, 96% either "agreed" or 
"strongly agreed" that trips scheduled with "reduced rest" cause a high level of 
fatigue, and a decreased level of safety. The K-S test revealed that age, flight 
experience, and flight deck position influenced the participant's responses to 
this item. As typical covariates, these age and experience differences are not 
unusual within aviation (Hawkins, 1993). Visual inspection of the data indicated 
that 100% of the "older" (at or above 40 years of age) participants either 
"agreed" or "strongly agreed" with this item. This may be a reflection of the 
previously mentioned study conducted by the NASA Ames Research Center 
which found that: 
82 
age was significantly correlated with an increased number of 
awakenings, a higher percentage of light drowsy (i.e., restless) sleep, 
a lower percentage of deep (slow-wave) sleep, and lower sleep 
efficiency. This was particularly true for those crewmembers over 
50 years of age. (The Royal Aeronautical Society, 1989, p.5.4) 
The "high time" (total flight time at or above 5000 hours and/or regional airline 
flight time at or above 3000 hours) participants and Captains may have been 
more willing to admit that fatigue has an impact on their performance, than the 
"low time" (total flight time below 5000 hours and/or regional airline flight time 
below 3000 hours) participants and First Officers. 
2. Continuous duty overnights are one of the primary detriments to 
adequate pilot rest in the regional airline industry. In response to the statement 
that CDOs cause a high level of fatigue, and a decreased level of safety, 90% of 
the participants either "agreed" or "strongly agreed." The K-S test revealed that 
flight deck position influenced the participant's response to this item. The First 
Officers may feel that they are invincible to the debilitating effects of fatigue, 
perhaps as a result of having not flown as many CDOs as the Captains have 
flown. The Spearman's rho test identified a significant correlation between the 
number of hours of sleep achieved by pilots scheduled for CDOs and the 
number of pilot errors that resulted in a decreased level of safety during the 
participant's previous 80 hours of flight time. 
3. The pilots assigned to 24-hour reserve are in violation of the FARs 
every time they fly a trip. "Because a reserve pilot has a present responsibility 
to work if called, that pilot is not free from restraint and, consequently, is not 
receiving the rest specified in the regulation" (FAA, 1993, p. 1). Of the 
participants who expressed an opinion on this subject, 100% either "agreed" or 
"strongly agreed" that reserve duty is not rest, and therefore, a pilot on 24-hour 
reserve status has not received a rest period as required by FAR 121.471. The 
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K-S test revealed that experience and flight deck position influenced the 
participant's responses to this item. As previously mentioned, the airlines 
chosen for this study either have reserve "windows" or no reserve duty at all. 
The Captains and "high time" participants have likely been in the industry 
longer than the First Officers and "low time" participants, and may have been 
previously employed by air carriers that schedule pilots for 24-hour reserve 
duty. Also, the Captains and "high time" subjects may simply possess a greater 
knowledge of the FARs and the issues faced by fellow pilots at other airlines. 
4. Fatigue is induced by a high number of departures and arrivals in a 
single duty day. Of the participants who expressed an opinion on this subject, 
96% either "agreed" or "strongly agreed" that duty days that include six or more 
departures and arrivals, should be preceded, and followed by a rest period two 
hours longer than normal. The K-S test revealed that flight deck position and 
experience influenced the participant's responses to this item. The Captains 
may actually experience greater fatigue than the First Officers, as a result of a 
high number of departures and arrivals. The Captain is typically responsible for 
taxiing the aircraft before takeoff and after landing. This may take an hour or 
more at some of the nation's largest airports. During taxi, the First Officer 
typically has to complete paperwork and make passenger announcements 
(which usually takes 3-5 minutes), after which the only remaining duty is to 
assist the Captain. Again, the "high time" participants may have been more 
willing to admit that fatigue has an impact on their performance, than the "low 
time" participants. The "low time" participants may still be on probation (typically 
a period of one year from date of hire, during which the pilot's employment may 
be terminated without cause and without union representation), and therefore, 
may have been reluctant to "complain" about fatigue. 
5. It was apparent in the literature and data, that a tired flight crew is 
more likely to commit errors that result in the degradation of safety. Ninety-two 
percent of the participants either "agreed" or "strongly agreed" that fatigue-
related human errors result in a decreased level of regional airline safety. The 
K-S test revealed that flight experience and flight deck position influenced the 
participant's opinions on this topic. Again, the First Officers and "low time" 
participants may feel that they are invincible to the effects of fatigue, perhaps as 
a result of not yet experiencing a significant number of fatigue-related errors or 
incidents. The Spearman's rho test identified a significant correlation between 
the percentage of time the participants flew fatigued in the previous 80 hours of 
flight time, and the number of pilot errors they committed, as well as the number 
of times they violated an FAR. The same correlations existed for the 
corresponding items which addressed the previous 500 hours of flight time. 
6. Scientific knowledge on the subjects of sleep, circadian physiology, 
sleepiness/alertness, and the performance degradation associated with these 
factors, has increased significantly over the past 40 years. A substantial amount 
of work has revealed many of the cognitive and motor skill mistakes that a tired, 
fatigued person makes when attempting to make decisions or perform complex 
tasks. Scientific research has been conducted in operational environments, 
including the field and flight simulators. The results of these studies confirm that 
fatigue resulting from sleep loss, circadian disruption, and excessive flight and 
duty periods, has impaired the performance of flight crews (Dinges, Graeber, 
Rosekind, Samel, & Wegmann, 1996). 
7. "In some respects, a pilot may be his or her own worst enemy in failing 
to perceive the onset of hazard-enabling fatigue" (Enders, 1989, p. 1). If a pilot 
does recognize that his fatigue state has reached an unsafe level, he must then 
confront his employer. Refusing a trip often results in a delay, while the crew 
schedulers attempt to find a reserve pilot to cover the trip. The chief pilot is 
typically notified, and the fatigued pilot is then called-in for a meeting with his 
supervisor. The pilot's pay is often reduced by the number of flight hours 
missed as a result of the fatigue call. An advisory letter which states that 
refusing a trip due to fatigue constitutes unsatisfactory job performance, is often 
placed in the pilot's personnel file. Many airlines have a policy of "three strikes, 
you're out." In other words, three advisory letters will result in immediate 
termination of employment. 
8. The fatigue problem is likely to intensify in the coming years. Human 
error has become the primary cause of the majority of airplane accidents. By 
1993, pilot error was the cause of 66% of all major airline accidents, 79% of all 
regional airline accidents, and 88% of all general aviation accidents (Moore-
Ede, 1993). With the current accident rate and the projected increase of the 
worldwide airline fleet, there will be a major accident every week by the year 
2010 (Weener, 1990). Adequate pilot rest is one of the primary issues that 
needs to be addressed in order to decrease the accident rate (Pasztor, 1996). 
CHAPTER VI 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Fatigue may be the leading factor that detrimentally impacts pilot 
performance. It is clear that there is no single "cure" for the problems relating to 
pilot fatigue. The aviation industry is comprised of thousands of individuals 
working for hundreds of diverse organizations, each with their own unique 
operational demands. Scheduling practices, personal strategies for pilots, 
FARs regarding duty and rest, and the design of technology are all areas in 
which the research results may be applied to their greatest benefit. The goal 
should be to apply the research results in an effort to lower the accident rates 
by maximizing flight crew alertness and performance. The following 
recommendations may reduce or eliminate some of the causes of pilot fatigue, 
thereby helping to improve regional airline safety: 
1. The FAA should revise the rest requirements provided in the FARs, so 
as to prohibit the practice of scheduling pilots for "reduced rest." 
2. Airline management should ensure that CDOs are eliminated 
wherever possible. This will probably increase the hotel costs; however, this 
may be off-set by increased utilization of flight crews. Pilots assigned to CDOs 
for an entire month, are typically paid for 15-45 hours more than they had flown 
during that month. 
3. The FAA should consistently enforce the Assistant Chief Counsel's 
interpretation which states that reserve "duty" is not "rest" (FAA, 1993). This 
would limit reserve duty to a 15-hour "window" within any 24-hour period. 
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4. The FAA should revise the FARs so that duty days that include six or 
more departures and arrivals, are preceded and followed by a rest period two 
hours longer than normal. 
5. The FAA should create FARs that would provide an incentive for the 
airlines to schedule a rest period that provides pilots with an adequate amount 
of time available for rest (TAR), embracing the hours between 2200 and 0600 
local time. The airline industry is a 24-hour operation, and the FAA should 
certainly not prohibit an airline from scheduling a pilot for a duty period between 
the hours of 2200 and 0600 (CDO). An appropriate FAR may include the 
following: (a) a tour of duty or period of reserve time at home, shall be preceded 
and followed by a rest period; (b) the rest period shall be at least equal in 
duration to the longer of the two associated duty periods, but not less than 10 
consecutive hours when the pilot is provided with a hotel room (within 15 
minutes normal driving time from the airport), or not less than 12 consecutive 
hours when the rest period is provided at the pilot's permanent home domicile; 
and (c) the rest period shall be extended by 2 additional hours if it does not 
embrace all of the hours between 2200-0600 local time, or if either associated 
duty period includes six or more departures and arrivals. A mandatory 2-hour 
rest period extension (as proposed in this recommendation) may create enough 
incentive for the airline's scheduling departments to provide pilots with rest 
periods at night, embracing the hours between 2200-0600 local time, whenever 
operationally feasible. This may reduce or perhaps eliminate CDOs. 
6. The significant body of scientific knowledge regarding cognitive 
fatigue needs to be applied to the daily operations of the airline industry. 
Varying work demands and the innovative use of flight deck automation, are 
two of the areas that researchers have recently studied (Dinges et al., 1996). 
7. The flight crews need to have the issue of fatigue addressed during 
their initial and recurrent training. A study conducted by Weitzel (1997) 
revealed that 98% of the total respondents (a sample of air carrier line captains, 
and individuals involved with aviation higher education and air carrier training 
and management) either moderately or strongly agreed that all aviation 
students should be educated/trained concerning the causes and the 
consequences of human fatigue. Techniques and strategies on maintaining 
peak alertness and safe performance throughout their shifts, should be 
presented. The goal should be to make them as knowledgeable about their 
own bodies, as they are about the airplanes they fly. The NTSB issued the 
following recommendation to the FAA in 1994: 
Require U.S. air carriers operating under 14 CFR Part 121 to include, as 
part of pilot training, a program to educate pilots about the detrimental 
effects of fatigue, and strategies for avoiding fatigue and countering its 
effects. (NTSB, 1994, p. 68) 
Some airlines do currently provide a few minutes of fatigue training during initial 
ground school, however this seems to fall short of the intent of the NTSB 
recommendation. The NTSB should persist with their recommendation, and 
emphasize to the FAA that such a program will greatly assist pilots in the 
recognition of their own personal symptoms of fatigue, and the development of 
personal strategies to help them cope with their very demanding work 
schedules. 
8. Further research should be conducted on the design and use of new 
technologies to improve pilot performance and alertness. The FAA and the 
airlines should help to promote this research. The airlines can assist by making 
their simulators available to the researchers, and the personnel in the airline's 
training departments could provide research assistance. 
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APPENDIX A 
AIA WRECKAGE AT UGM 
(Photo Courtesy NTSB) 
96 
97 
APPENDIX B 
AIA CVR TRANSCRIPT 
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The following exchange of conversation was recorded by the CVR: 
? : unidentified crewmember 
* : unintelligible word 
# : expletive 
( ) : questionable insertion 
(( )) : editorial insertion 
16:41:53 Captain 
16:42:04 First Officer 
16:42:52 to 16:44:41 
16:44:50 Flight Engineer 
16:44:53 First Officer 
16:45:12 to 16:51:56 
16:52:17 First Officer 
16:52:20 
16:52:21 
16:52:22 
16:52:23 
Flight Engineer 
Captain 
Flight Engineer 
Captain 
otta make that one zero approach just 
for the heck of it, to see how it is. why 
don't we do that, lets tell 'em we'll take 
one zero, if we miss it well just come 
back around and land on two eight. 
OK. 
miscellaneous discussion about proper 
traffic pattern entry, weather, and 
descent checklist. 
just don't do no rolls on final. 
wanna make sure you're wings level 
and you're on center line because you 
have those uh, VASIs there, for 
catching. 
miscellaneous discussion about aircraft 
position, weather and approach 
checklist. 
I think you're gettin' in close, before you 
start your turn. 
yeah, the runway's right here man. 
yeah, I got it. yeah, I got it. 
you're right on it. 
* going to have to really honk it. let's 
get the gear down **. 
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16:52:25 to 16:53:19 
16:53:22 Flight Engineer 
16:53:25 First Officer 
16:53:28 
16:53:29 
16:53:31 
16:53:33 
16:53:35 
16:53:37 
16:53:37 
16:53:41 
16:53:42 
16:53:45 
16:53:48 
16:53:57 
16:53:58 
16:53:58 
16:54:01 
16:54:06 
16:54:09 
16:54:10 
Captain 
Flight Engineer 
Captain 
First Officer 
Flight Engineer 
Captain 
First Officer 
Captain 
Flight Engineer 
Captain 
First Officer 
Captain 
First Officer 
Captain 
First Officer 
Flight Engineer 
miscellaneous discussion about 
location of runway and captain 
requesting flaps 50. 
slow, airspeed. 
check the turn. 
where's the strobe. 
right over there. 
where. 
right inside there, right inside there. 
you know, we're not getting our 
airspeed back there. 
where's the strobe. 
right down there. 
I still don't see it. 
# we're never goin' to make this. 
where do you see a strobe light? 
right over here. 
where's the strobe? 
do you think you're gonna make this? 
yeah...if I can catch the strobe light. 
five hundred, you're in good shape. 
watch the, keep your airspeed up. 
((Sound similar to stall warning)) 
Unidentified crew (don't), stall warning. 
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16:54:11 
16:54:12 
16:54:12 
16:54:13 
Captain 
First Officer 
Flight Engineer 
Captain 
I got it. 
stall warning. 
stall warning. 
I got it, back off. 
16:54:13 Unidentified crew max power ((concurrent with previous 
statement)) 
16:54:15 Unidentified crew there it goes, there it goes. 
16:54:16 Unidentified crew oh no. 
16:54:17 ((sounds of several screams)). 
16:54:20 End of Recording (pp. 100-125). 
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APPENDIX C 
NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULE MAKING (NPRM 95-18) 
102 
Proposed Flight Time Limitations and Rest Requirements 
(Air Line Pilots Association, 1996) 
Normal scheduled rest period -10 hours. May be reduced to 9 hours for 
circumstances beyond the control of the carrier, but may not be 
scheduled to be reduced. 
Normal scheduled duty day -14 hours. May be extended to 16 hours for 
circumstances beyond the control of the carrier. If the duty day is 
extended beyond 14 hours, the rest period may not be reduced. 
Flight time limits - Block to block 
2 Pilots -10 scheduled flight hours, maximum 14 scheduled hours 
of duty. 
3 Pilots -12 scheduled flight hours, maximum 16 scheduled hours 
of duty; subsequent rest period must be 14 hours minimum. 
3 Pilots -16 scheduled flight hours (requires inflight rest facility) -
maximum 18 scheduled hours of duty; subsequent rest period 
must be 18 hours minimum. 
4 Pilots (International only) - Maximum 18 scheduled flight hours 
(requires inflight rest facility) - maximum 24 scheduled hours of 
duty; subsequent rest period must be 22 hours minimum. 
36 continuous hours free of duty every 7 days. 
Weekly flight time limits - 32 hours 
Monthly flight time limits -100 hours 
Annual flight time limits -1200 hours (not specifically stated, but implied). 
Detailed provisions for reserve to assure rested crews. 
Part 91 flight time, such as ferry flights, will be included in these limits. 
There are definitions which will help with an understanding of the rule 
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Proposed Duty Period Limitations for Reserve Pilots 
(Air Line Pilots Association, 1996) 
Number of hours notification 
prior to report time 
Maximum scheduled 
duty period 
Less than 4 hours 6 hours 
4 or more hours 
but less than 6 
8 hours 
6 or more hours 
but less than 8 
10 hours 
8 or more hours 
but less than 10 
12 hours 
10 or more hours same as maximum 
allowed for non 
reserve pilots 
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APPENDIX D 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF CONTINUOUS DUTY OVERNIGHTS 
105 
Hotel Cost Analysis 
Normal rest period provided at outstation (necessitates laying over two crews) 
6 rooms/night for 30 days @ $29./night/room = $5220.00 
Continuous duty overnight (only one crew laid over) 
3 rooms/night for 30 days @ $29./night/room 
Hotel Savings 
$2610.00 
$2610.00 
Crew Salary Analysis 
Actual crew salary for 30 days 
Captain: 
First Officer: 
Flight Attendant: 
$60./hr x 75 hours = $4500.00 
$25./hr x 75 hours = $1875.00 
$20./hr x 75 hours = $1500.00 
$7875.00 
Crew salary based on number of hours flown 
Captain: 
First Officer: 
Flight Attendant: 
$60./hr x 40 hours = $2400.00 
$25./hr x 40 hours = $1000.00 
$20./hr x 40 hours = $ 800.00 
$4200.00 
Over-pay due to continuous duty overnight crew only flying 
40 hours per month 
Summary 
Over-pay due to continuous duty overnight crew only flying 
40 hours per month 
Hotel Savings 
$7875.00 
$4200.00 
$3675.00 
$3675.00 
$2610.00 
Monthly net loss per crew assigned to continuous duty overnights $1065.00 
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APPENDIX E 
FIELD SURVEY COVER LETTER AND QUESTIONNAIRE 
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Dear Colleague: 
I am presently on furlough from Pan Am and working on a Master's degree in 
Aviation Safety at Embry-Riddle. I realize that your schedule is probably very 
hectic, however I would greatly appreciate your response to the attached 
survey. 
I flew with the regional airlines for approximately six years, and feel that the 
industry has an outstanding safety record. The excellent training provided by 
the regional airlines, combined with a very dedicated, professional group of 
pilots and management has led to this outstanding safety record. 
This study is concerned with the impact of mental fatigue on pilot performance. 
An aviation psychologist has stated that mental fatigue is typically associated 
with tasks demanding intense concentration, rapid or complex information 
processing, and other high level cognitive skills. Wherever this survey refers to 
fatigue, please consider it from this concept of cognitive or mental fatigue. 
You will find an attached envelope for you to return the completed survey. I 
would appreciate your response by January 31, 1998. Please do not include 
your name or the name of your employer. Please feel free to skip any question 
that you would rather not answer. The data gathered will be analyzed and 
incorporated in a Master's thesis, which should be completed by the end of the 
summer. The resulting conclusions and recommendations will be made 
available to interested parties within the industry. I would be happy to send you 
a summary of the results. Please send your request, along with a self-
addressed, stamped envelope, to the address provided below (please do not 
include your request with the survey, in order to ensure your anonymity). Thank 
you very much for your cooperation. 
Sincerely yours, 
Douglas S. Mikkelsen 
133A Golden Eye Dr. 
Daytona Beach, FL 32119 
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Please respond to the following statements by circling one of the five choices: 
1=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Undecided, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly Agree 
1. Fatigue has a negative impact on 
pilot performance. 
2. Fatigue is a contributing factor to 
human errors on the flight deck. 
3. These fatigue-related human errors result 
in a decreased level of regional airline safety. 
4. These fatigue-related human errors have 
led to violations of FARs. 
5. The existing FARs pertaining to flight time 
limitations and rest requirements, do not 
provide adequate rest for the prevention 
of fatigue. 
6. Continuous Duty Overnights (Stand-ups, 
High-speeds) cause a high level of fatigue, 
and a decreased level of safety. 
7. The intent of the "reduced rest" provision 
in the FARs has been abused by regional 
airline schedules (trips are scheduled with 
reduced rest). 
8. 24-hour reserve causes a high level of 
fatigue, and a decreased level of safety. 
9. Departures and arrivals demand intense 
concentration, and contribute to a higher 
level of fatigue. 
10. Duty days that include six or more 
departures and arrivals, should be preceded 
and followed by a rest period two hours 
longer than normal. 
Strongly Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
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Please respond to the following questions in the space provided. 
11. Please select your current position. 
Regional Airline Captain Regional Airline F.O. 
12. Please provide your approximate total flight time. 
13. Please provide your approximate total regional airline flight time. 
14. Your gender. Male Female 
15. Your age. Years 
16. How many hours of sleep are adequate for the minimization of fatige? 
17. How many hours are you able to sleep (average), while on a nine-hour 
rest period provided between the hours of 21:00 and 09:00(local)? 
18. How many hours are you able to sleep (average), while on a nine-hour 
rest period provided between the hours of 09:00 and 21:00(local) (CDO)? 
19. How many hours should the minimum rest period be, in order to allow 
adequate sleep for the minimization of fatigue? 
20(a). What percentage of time have you felt fatigued during your last 80 hours 
of flight time? % 
(b). How many fatigue related errors have you made during your last 80 hours 
of flight time? 
(c). How many of these errors resulted in a decreased level of safety? 
(d). How many of these errors led to a violation of the FARs? 
21(a). What percentage of time have you felt fatigued during your last 500 hours 
of flight time? % 
(b). How many fatigue related errors have you made during your last 500 hours 
of flight time? 
(c). How many of these errors resulted in a decreased level of safety? 
(d). How many of these errors led to a violation of the FARs? 
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This space is for your comments. 
Please provide the question number that your comments refer to 
(where appropriate). 
Thank you for your expertise. 
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APPENDIX F 
COVER LETTER AND THE INSTRUMENT 
112 
Dear Colleague: 
I am presently on furlough from Pan Am and working on a Master's degree in 
Aviation Safety at Embry-Riddle. I realize that your schedule is probably very 
hectic, however I would greatly appreciate your response to the attached 
survey. 
I flew with the regional airlines for approximately six years, and feel that the 
industry has an outstanding safety record. The excellent training provided by 
the regional airlines, combined with a very dedicated, professional group of 
pilots and management has led to this outstanding safety record. 
This study is concerned with the impact of mental fatigue on pilot performance. 
An aviation psychologist has stated that mental fatigue is typically associated 
with tasks demanding intense concentration, rapid or complex information 
processing, and other high level cognitive skills. Wherever this survey refers to 
fatigue, please consider it from this concept of cognitive or mental fatigue. 
You will find an attached envelope for you to return the completed survey. I 
would appreciate your response by April 30, 1998. Please do not include your 
name or the name of your employer. Please feel free to skip any question that 
you would rather not answer. The data gathered will be analyzed and 
incorporated in a Master's thesis, which should be completed by the end of the 
summer. The resulting conclusions and recommendations will be made 
available to interested parties within the industry. I would be happy to send you 
a summary of the results. Please send your request, along with a self-
addressed, stamped envelope, to the address provided below (please do not 
include your request with the survey, in order to ensure your anonymity). Thank 
you very much for your cooperation. 
Sincerely yours, 
Douglas S. Mikkelsen 
133A Golden Eye Dr. 
Daytona Beach, FL 32119 
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Please respond to the following statements by circling one of the five choices: 
1=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Undecided, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly Agree 
1. Fatigue has a negative impact on 
pilot performance. 
2. Fatigue is a contributing factor to 
human errors on the flight deck. 
3. Fatigue-related human errors result 
in a decreased level of regional airline safety. 
4. Fatigue-related human errors have 
led to violations of FARs. 
Strongly Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. The existing FARs pertaining to flight time 
limitations and rest requirements, provide 1 
adequate rest for the prevention of fatigue. 
6. Continuous Duty Overnights (Stand-ups, 
High-speeds) cause a high level of fatigue, 1 
and a decreased level of safety. 
7. Trips scheduled with "reduced rest" cause 1 
a high level of fatigue, and a decreased level 
of safety. 
8. Departures and arrivals demand intense 
concentration, and contribute to a higher 1 
level of fatigue. 
9. Duty days that include six or more 
departures and arrivals, should be preceded 1 
and followed by a rest period two hours 
longer than normal. 
10. Reserve "duty" is not "rest", and therefore a 
pilot on 24-hour reserve status has not received 1 
a rest period as required by FAR 121.471. 
11. 24-hour reserve causes a high level of 
fatigue, and a decreased level of safety. 1 2 3 4 5 
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Please respond to the following questions in the space provided. 
12. Please select your current position. 
Regional Airline Captain Regional Airline F.O. 
13. Please provide your approximate total flight time. 
14. Please provide your approximate total regional airline flight time. 
15. Your gender. Male Female 
16. Your age. Years 
17. How many hours of sleep do you need, to be fully rested? 
18. How many hours are you able to sleep (average), while on a nine-hour 
rest period provided between the hours of 21:00 and 09:00(local)? 
19. How many hours are you able to sleep (average), while on a nine-hour 
rest period provided between the hours of 09:00 and 21:00(local) (CDO)? 
20. How many hours should the minimum rest period be, in order to allow 
adequate sleep for the minimization of fatigue? 
21(a). What percentage of time have you felt fatigued during your last 80 hours 
of flight time? % 
(b). How many fatigue related errors have you made during your last 80 hours 
of flight time? 
(c). How many of these errors resulted in a decreased level of safety? 
(d). How many of these errors led to a violation of the FARs? 
22(a). What percentage of time have you felt fatigued during your last 500 hours 
of flight time? % 
(b). How many fatigue related errors have you made during your last 500 hours 
of flight time? 
(c). How many of these errors resulted in a decreased level of safety? 
(d). How many of these errors led to a violation of the FARs? 
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This space is for your comments. 
(Please provide the question number, if your comments refer to an 
item from this survey). 
Thank you for your expertise. 
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APPENDIX G 
SPEARMAN'S RHO CORRELATION MATRIX 
Spearman's Rho 
Correlation Matrix 
Above or Below 5000 Hours 
Above or Below 3000 hours 
Above or Below Age 40 
Sleep Normally Required 
Sleep Achieved 2100-0900 
Sleep Achieved 0900-2100 
Minimum Rest Period 
Fatigued Last 30 Days 
Errors Last 30 Days 
Safety Decrements Last 30 Days 
FAR Violations Last 30 Days 
Fatigued Last 180 Days 
Errors Last 180 Days 
Safety Decrements Last 180 Days 
FAR Violations Last 180 Days 
Above or 
Below 
5000 
Hours 
1 000 
865 
430 
145 
157 
003 
-107 
038 
054 
002 
-129 
-057 
-079 
-033 
-024 
Above or 
Below 
3000 
hours 
1 000 
411 
016 
009 
000 
-244 
-056 
024 
-034 
-212 
-189 
-097 
-069 
-087 
Above or 
Below 
Age 40 
1000 
117 
021 
-162 
-201 
-039 
-041 
026 
138 
-064 
-077 
010 
190 
Sleep 
Normally 
Required 
1000 
390 
236 
107 
-027 
-142 
-097 
056 
015 
-121 
-109 
-036 
Sleep 
Achieved 
2100-
0900 
1 000 
-199 
-289 
040 
-190 
-056 
-072 
-012 
-208 
-173 
-225 
Sleep 
Achieved 
0900-
2100 
1000 
147 
-144 
-184 
-282 
166 
-116 
-266 
-271 
068 
Minimum 
Rest 
Penod 
1000 
112 
249 
149 
301 
294 
154 
297 
291 
Fatigued 
Last 30 
Days 
1 000 
332 
138 
280 
827 
271 
285 
348 
Errors 
Last 30 
Days 
1 000 
519 
062 
290 
886 
629 
177 
Safety 
Decrements 
Last 30 
Days 
1 000 
314 
231 
455 
885 
395 
FAR 
Violations 
Last 30 
Days 
1 000 
322 
000 
299 
780 
Fatigued 
Last 
180 
Days 
1000 
249 
363 
424 
Errors 
Last 
180 
Days 
1000 
606 
148 
Safety FAR 
Decrements Violations 
Last 180 Last 180 
Days Days 
1 000 
408 
